Smith v. Landfair

135 Ohio St. 3d 89, 2012-Ohio-5692 (2012) · Supreme Court of Ohio · December 6, 2012 · No. 2011-1708

Summary

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that a person who purposefully places themselves where equine activities are occurring and sees such an activity is a “spectator” and therefore an equine activity participant under R.C. 2305.321(A)(3)(g). The court reversed the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for consideration of remaining issues, including wanton conduct and the rescue doctrine.

Court
Supreme Court of Ohio
Writing for the Court
Lanzinger, J.; O'Connor, C.J.; Lundberg Stratton, J.; O'Donnell, J.; Cupp, J.; McGee Brown, J.; Pfeifer, J.
Jurisdiction
Ohio
Decision date
December 6, 2012
Docket number
2011-1708
Procedural posture
Landfair appealed the Ninth District Court of Appeals' reversal of a trial court order granting summary judgment based on Ohio's equine-activities-immunity statute. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted one proposition of law concerning the meaning of 'spectator.'
Precedential value
Published and precedential Supreme Court of Ohio opinion
Parties
Donald Landfair v. Roshel Smith
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

personal injurystatutory interpretationtortsappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

tortspersonal injurystatutory interpretationsummary judgmentappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a person is a 'spectator' and therefore an 'equine activity participant' under R.C. 2305.321(A)(3)(g) when the person voluntarily places herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and sees the activity, even without intending to watch the specific activity that causes the injury.
  2. Whether Smith's claim was barred by Ohio's equine-activities-immunity statute based on the undisputed facts.

Holdings

  1. A person is a 'spectator' and therefore an 'equine activity participant' under R.C. 2305.321(A)(3)(g) when the person voluntarily and purposefully places herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and sees an equine activity. Intent to watch the specific activity is not required, but merely being a passerby or momentarily glancing at a horse is insufficient.
  2. Smith was an equine-activity participant as a matter of law, and her personal-injury claim was barred by R.C. 2305.321(B)(1), subject to unresolved issues concerning statutory exceptions and other assignments of error.

Key quotations

Thus, we hold that one who purposely places himself or herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and who sees such an activity is a “spectator” and hence an “equine activity participant” within the meaning of R.C. 2305.321(A)(3)(g). (135 Ohio St. 3d at 97)
Simply being in the vicinity of equine activities is not enough. Rather, the person must be there voluntarily, aware that equine activities are occurring. (135 Ohio St. 3d at 98)

Factual background

Landfair boarded two horses at CJS Standardbred Stables and, on March 28, 2007, transported them off-site for blacksmithing before returning to unload them. Smith, who worked at the stable and had stopped by to visit her father, stood near the barn doorway watching her father exercise another horse and saw Landfair begin unloading Annie. When Annie was spooked by a passing horse-drawn wagon, she pushed Landfair out of the trailer; Smith ran to assist and was kicked in the head, suffering facial and head injuries.

Procedural history

Smith sued Landfair in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas for personal injuries suffered when she was kicked by Landfair's horse while attempting to assist him. The trial court granted Landfair summary judgment, concluding that Smith was an equine-activity participant and that the statutory immunity applied. The Ninth District reversed and remanded, holding that Smith was not a spectator. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Ninth District and remanded for consideration of the remaining assignments of error.

Remand instructions

The case was remanded to the Ninth District Court of Appeals to consider Smith's remaining assignments of error, including whether Landfair's conduct was wanton, whether Landfair was controlling Annie under R.C. 2305.321(A)(3)(a), and whether the statute abrogated the common-law rescue doctrine.

Court Document

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