Summary
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that jury instructions defining “enterprise,” “pattern of corrupt activity,” and related statutory terms under R.C. 2923.32 and R.C. 2923.31 sufficiently conveyed the law. The court reversed the Second District Court of Appeals’ judgment overturning De’Argo Griffin’s conviction and remanded for sentencing, answering the certified question in the affirmative.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether, in a prosecution under R.C. 2923.32, jury instructions that state the offense elements, provide the statutory definitions of enterprise and pattern of corrupt activity, and require proof beyond a reasonable doubt adequately convey the law concerning the enterprise element.
- Whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury using language from federal cases concerning the meaning of enterprise.
Holdings
- A jury instruction is sufficient when, read as a whole, it states the elements of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, provides the statutory definitions of enterprise and pattern of corrupt activity, and requires the jury to find those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; the instruction need not separately state that enterprise members acted in concert and shared a common purpose.
Key quotations
“No purpose is served, for instance, by requiring courts to present redundant jury instructions or instructions that are so similar to other instructions to be presented as to be confusing.” (¶ 5)
“Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand to the trial court for sentencing.” (¶ 13)
Factual background
Griffin was convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity based on drug-related conduct occurring in Montgomery County between May 13, 2006, and April 2, 2009. The trial court instructed the jury using the statutory definitions of enterprise, corrupt activity, and pattern of corrupt activity, and required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Griffin argued that the instruction also needed to state that the enterprise members acted in concert and shared a common purpose.
Procedural history
Griffin was convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and other offenses. His convictions were initially affirmed, but the Second District reopened the appeal based on a claim that appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge the enterprise instruction, then reversed the corrupt-activity conviction. The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the certified conflict and the State's discretionary appeal and reversed the Second District's judgment.
Remand instructions
The cause was remanded to the trial court for sentencing.