Summary
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed Bennie Adams's aggravated-murder conviction but vacated his death sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the predicate offenses in an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) capital specification are alternative means, requiring appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each alleged predicate offense when the jury has not specified which one it found. Because the state failed to prove all alleged alternative means, the death sentence was legally unsupported, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred seeking the death penalty on remand.
Questions Presented
- Whether the aggravated-murder prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to the predicate felonies.
- Whether the statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights were violated by the 1985-to-2007 prosecution delay.
- Whether preindictment delay violated due process.
- Whether the trial court erred in voir dire time limits, juror questioning, juror excusals, handling of juror misconduct, and the incomplete record.
- Whether the lineup and eyewitness-identification evidence required suppression or an exclusionary hearing.
- Whether testimony concerning Tenney's fear and state of mind was admissible.
- Whether the warrantless search of a jacket that produced Tenney's ATM card violated the Fourth Amendment.
- Whether the trial court properly refused an involuntary-manslaughter instruction and gave the post-Jenks circumstantial-evidence instruction.
- Whether the omnibus R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) capital specification violated the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support each alternative predicate offense underlying the capital specification.
Holdings
- The statute of limitations for an underlying felony does not bar prosecution for aggravated murder, because aggravated murder is a separate offense and R.C. 2901.13(A)(2) imposes no limitations period for aggravated murder.
- The 2007 aggravated-murder indictment did not relate back to Adams's 1985 arrest for receiving stolen property because the later prosecution arose from evidence and facts that were unavailable at the time of the earlier arrest. Adams's statutory speedy-trial rights were therefore not violated.
- The constitutional speedy-trial claim failed because the relevant delay was not presumptively prejudicial. The period after the 1986 grand-jury no bill did not count because Adams was not under official prosecution or detention for the Tenney homicide during that period.
- Adams failed to establish substantial prejudice from the preindictment delay and therefore failed to prove a due-process violation.
- The trial court properly admitted Adams's statements because he did not unambiguously request counsel and knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.
- The search of the jacket pocket that produced Tenney's ATM card was constitutional because it was undertaken incident to Landers's lawful arrest and was permissible under the governing law at the time.
- Applying State v. Jenks retroactively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, Ohio's Retroactivity Clause, or due process because Jenks changed the procedure for evaluating circumstantial evidence rather than the elements or punishment of the offense.
- The predicate offenses listed in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) are alternative means of establishing the aggravating circumstance. When multiple predicate offenses are alleged, the jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed aggravated murder during one or more of the alleged predicate offenses, but it need not unanimously agree on which predicate offense was committed.
- When multiple alternative predicate offenses are alleged, the jury has not identified which predicate offense it found, and the appellate court determines that the state proved some but not all of the alternative means, the evidence is legally insufficient to support a death sentence and the death sentence must be vacated.
Key quotations
“the evidence is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a death sentence and the death sentence must be vacated.” (Syllabus ¶ 4)
“the state is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution from seeking the death penalty on remand.” (Syllabus ¶ 5)
Factual background
Gina Tenney was raped and murdered in Youngstown in December 1985. Adams, who lived in the same duplex, became a suspect after Tenney's ATM card, keys, television, and other evidence were connected to him; later DNA testing identified Adams as a possible source of semen found on Tenney's vaginal swab and underwear. After a 2007 cold-case investigation, Adams was prosecuted, convicted of aggravated murder, and sentenced to death.
Procedural history
Adams was indicted in 2007 for the 1985 aggravated murder of Gina Tenney. The trial court dismissed the noncapital counts on statute-of-limitations grounds, but Adams was convicted of aggravated murder and an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) capital specification and was sentenced to death. The Seventh District affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the conviction but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Remand instructions
The aggravated-murder conviction is affirmed. The death sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with the opinion. The state may not seek the death penalty on remand because doing so would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.