Summary
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on a manufacturer's postmarket duty to warn under Ohio Revised Code 2307.76(A)(2). The court concluded that the evidence concerned risks known before the vehicle was sold and did not sufficiently establish the likelihood of post-sale harm. It reversed the judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Appeals.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court was required to instruct the jury on a manufacturer's postmarketing duty to warn under Ohio Revised Code 2307.76(A)(2).
- Whether evidence of Ford's post-sale fire-suppression system and trunk-pack improvements was relevant to the Linerts' postmarketing failure-to-warn claim.
- Whether the evidence established sufficient likelihood of risk to support a postmarketing duty-to-warn instruction.
Holdings
- A claim alleging failure to warn after a product has been sold is separate and conceptually distinct from a claim that a warning should have been provided when the product was marketed.
- The fact-finder must focus on evidence of a product-associated risk of which the manufacturer acquired knowledge after the product was sold; evidence of risks known before sale is relevant to a presale warning claim but not to the postmarketing claim.
- The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on a postmarketing duty to warn because the Linerts did not present sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine the likelihood of the relevant risk and whether Ford acted unreasonably by failing to warn.
Key quotations
“we clarify that a claim for failing to warn after the product is sold is separate from a claim that a warning should have been given at the point of sale.” (¶ 29)
“In considering a postmarket duty to warn, the fact-finder’s focus must be on any evidence of a risk associated with the product of which the manufacturer acquires knowledge after the sale of the product.” (¶ 32)
“But speculative risk does not equal known risk.” (¶ 38)
“We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand this cause to the trial court to reinstate its judgment in favor of appellant, Ford Motor Company.” (¶ 39)
Factual background
Ross Linert was driving a 2005 Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor when an intoxicated driver traveling at approximately 90 to 110 miles per hour struck the vehicle from behind. The collision allegedly dislodged the vehicle's fuel-sender unit, released fuel, and caused a fire that severely burned Ross. The Linerts presented evidence of 34 similar rear-impact incidents involving Panther-platform vehicles, including six involving fuel-sender-unit dislodgement, and evidence that Ford later implemented a crimp-improvement project and developed a fire-suppression system.
Procedural history
Ross Linert initially sued Adrien Foutz for negligence and later amended the complaint to add Ross and Brenda Linert's product-liability and malice claims against Ford. After a two-week trial, the jury found for Ford on all claims, and the trial court entered judgment for Ford. The court of appeals reversed in part, held that a postmarketing failure-to-warn instruction and evidence concerning Ford's fire-suppression system were warranted, and ordered a new trial on the postmarketing failure-to-warn claim. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate judgment and remanded for reinstatement of the trial court's judgment for Ford.
Remand instructions
Remand to the trial court to reinstate its judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company.