Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day School, 2007 OK 60

Summary

The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether provisions of 85 O.S. Supp. 2005, § 17(A), governing medical opinions in workers' compensation proceedings, impermissibly delegated judicial fact-finding authority. The court upheld the rebuttable presumption favoring the treating physician's opinions but held unconstitutional and severed language restricting the Workers' Compensation Court's impairment determination to the range of opinions of the treating physician and independent medical examiner. The court reversed the workers' compensation order in part and left the remainder in effect.

Holdings

1. The rebuttable presumption in favor of the treating physician's opinions is a procedural device that does not assign evidentiary weight or adjudicative power to the physician and is facially constitutional.
2. The language requiring the Workers' Compensation Court to establish its own opinion within the range of opinions of the treating physician and independent medical examiner unconstitutionally invades the judiciary's exclusive fact-finding authority under the Oklahoma Constitution.
3. The phrase "within the range of opinions of the treating physician and the Independent Medical Examiner" is severable from § 17(A)(2)(b), and the remaining statutory provisions may remain in effect.
4. When competent, probative objective medical evidence contrary to the treating physician's opinion is admitted, the presumption disappears and the Workers' Compensation Court must weigh all admitted evidence and adjudicate the issues.

Questions Presented

1. Whether 85 O.S. Supp. 2005, § 17(A)(2)(a)'s rebuttable presumption in favor of the treating physician's opinions is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.
2. Whether the language in § 17(A)(2)(b) requiring the Workers' Compensation Court to establish impairment within the range of opinions of the treating physician and independent medical examiner violates the Oklahoma Constitution's separation-of-powers provision.
3. Whether the unconstitutional language can be severed from § 17(A)(2)(b) while preserving the remainder of the statute.
4. Whether the statutory scheme violated due process.

Disposition

reversed