Summary
The Supreme Court of Oregon vacated Randy Lee Guzek’s death sentence because the trial court improperly failed to instruct the penalty-phase jury on the true-life sentencing option, which Guzek had expressly chosen to accept. The court remanded for further proceedings and addressed issues likely to arise on remand, including the retroactive application of statutory provisions concerning aggravating evidence and victim-impact evidence under state and federal ex post facto principles.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the penalty-phase jury on the true-life sentencing option after Guzek waived applicable ex post facto protections.
- Whether retroactive application of the 1995 and 1997 statutory provisions permitting any aggravating evidence violated the Oregon Constitution's ex post facto prohibition.
- Whether retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provisions violated state or federal ex post facto protections, and whether Oregon Constitution Article I, section 42 superseded any conflicting state constitutional protection.
- Whether evidence offered to impeach unavailable state witnesses' prior testimony could be excluded solely as hearsay.
- Whether alibi evidence was admissible as mitigating evidence in the penalty phase despite contradicting the prior guilt-phase verdict.
Holdings
- The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the penalty-phase jury on the true-life sentencing option after Guzek expressly waived the ex post facto protections that otherwise would have barred retroactive application of that option.
- Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution prohibits retroactive application to Guzek's remanded penalty-phase proceeding of the 1995 and 1997 provisions allowing the State to introduce any aggravating evidence under ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B).
- In any subsequent penalty-phase proceeding, Oregon Constitution Article I, section 42(1)(a), gives victims a right to offer relevant evidence concerning the victims' personal characteristics and the impact of the crimes on their family, and that right supersedes any conflicting defendant right under Article I, section 21.
- Retroactive admission of victim-impact evidence under the 1995 and 1997 amendments does not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause because the amendments did not lower the minimum quantum of evidence required to obtain a death sentence.
- When the State uses prior testimony of unavailable witnesses to prove penalty-phase elements and thereby makes their credibility relevant, the defendant may introduce inconsistent statements for a nonhearsay impeachment purpose; the evidence may not be excluded solely under the hearsay rule without determining that purpose.
- Under ORS 163.150 and the Eighth Amendment, alibi evidence that the defendant offers in mitigation must be admitted in a subsequent capital penalty-phase proceeding, even if it contradicts the prior guilt-phase verdict.
Key quotations
“Therefore, Article I, section 21, prohibits retroactive application of the "any aggravating evidence" provisions of ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) to defendant on remand, as discussed in Fugate.” (86 P.3d at 1114)
“Because defendant offered his evidence for that purpose, it did not qualify as hearsay, and the trial court erred by excluding it on that basis.” (86 P.3d at 1121)
“Applying the Court's reasoning in Green, we conclude that such evidence was "highly relevant to a critical issue" in the penalty phase, Green, 442 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, and therefore was required to be considered by the jury under the Eighth Amendment.” (86 P.3d at 1128)
Factual background
Randy Lee Guzek and two associates went to the home of Rod and Lois Houser intending to kill them and steal their property. One associate repeatedly shot Rod Houser, and Guzek located and shot Lois Houser three times; the men then ransacked the house and stole property. Guzek was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and received a death sentence after a third penalty-phase proceeding.
Procedural history
Guzek was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder, and this court affirmed the convictions in State v. Guzek, 310 Or. 299 (1990). The court twice vacated prior death sentences and remanded for new penalty-phase proceedings, first because the jury had not received a general mitigation question and later because victim-impact evidence was improperly admitted under the then-applicable statutory scheme. After the third penalty-phase proceeding again resulted in a death sentence, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated that sentence and remanded for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
Vacate the sentence of death and remand to the Oregon circuit court for further proceedings. If the State pursues another death sentence, the court must instruct the jury on the true-life option; may not retroactively apply the any-aggravating-evidence provisions to admit evidence outside the first three statutory questions or rebuttal of particular mitigation; must permit relevant victim-impact evidence under Article I, section 42; must assess whether offered impeachment evidence has a nonhearsay purpose; and must admit any alibi evidence offered in mitigation.