Summary
The Oregon Supreme Court addressed whether evidence obtained through voluntary consent searches must be suppressed when the consent follows an unlawful stop under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The court disavowed the “minimal factual nexus” component of the test from State v. Hall and held that the state must prove both that the consent was voluntary and that it was not the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop. Applying that standard, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Oregon Supreme Court should overrule or modify State v. Hall's exploitation test for evidence obtained after an illegal stop and voluntary consent.
- When a defendant establishes an illegal stop and challenges a subsequent consent search, what burden and legal test govern voluntariness and exploitation under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
- Whether Hemenway's three consents to search were obtained through exploitation of the illegal stop such that the resulting evidence had to be suppressed.
Holdings
- The court disavowed the minimal-factual-nexus portion of Hall's two-part test because it was drawn from a warrant-based case, was inconsistent with ORS 133.693(4), and had caused confusion in application.
- When a defendant establishes that an illegal stop occurred and challenges a subsequent consent search, the state must prove both that the consent was voluntary and that, even if voluntary, it was not the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop.
- Whether police exploited an illegal stop to obtain consent depends on the totality of the circumstances, including temporal proximity, intervening or mitigating circumstances, the purpose and egregiousness of the police conduct, and the verbal and nonverbal interactions leading to consent.
- Hemenway's three voluntary consents were not products of or tainted by the illegal stop, so suppression would not vindicate his Article I, section 9, rights.
Key quotations
“For the reasons that follow, we disavow the “minimal factual nexus” part of the Hall test and instead hold that, when a defendant has established that an illegal stop occurred and challenges the validity of his or her subsequent consent to a search, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that (1) the consent was voluntary; and (2) the consent, even if voluntary, was not the product of police exploitation of the illegal stop.” (141)
“If the defendant shows that he or she was stopped illegally and challenges the validity of his or her consent to search, then the state is required to prove that the police did not exploit their illegal conduct to obtain consent.” (148)
“Accordingly, defendant’s arrest was lawful, and defendant’s voluntary consent to search the house following his arrest did not violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” (154)
Factual background
Deputies responding to a welfare-related call arrived at the residence where Hemenway was outside near a truck containing firearms. The deputies parked behind the truck, directed Hemenway to speak with one of them, questioned him about whether he was a felon, and obtained identifying information, creating an unlawful stop because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. During the encounter, Hemenway voluntarily consented to a pat-down, consented to opening a small tin containing drug paraphernalia, and, after arrest and Miranda warnings, consented to a search of the residence.
Procedural history
The Tillamook County Circuit Court denied Hemenway's suppression motion and accepted his conditional guilty plea for possession of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals held that the police had unlawfully stopped Hemenway and remanded for further proceedings concerning his subjective belief and suppression of the evidence under State v. Hall. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.