Commonwealth v. Tharp

627 Pa. 673 (Pa. 2014) (Pa. 2014) · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · September 24, 2014

Summary

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed Michelle Sue Tharp’s appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief arising from her conviction and death sentence for starving her seven-year-old daughter to death. The court affirmed the denial of relief on her guilt-phase claims, including alleged Brady violations, but held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental-health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. The court remanded for a new penalty hearing.

Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Writing for the Court
Justice Baer; Chief Justice Castille; Justice Eakin; Justice McCaffery; Justice Saylor; Justice Stevens; Justice Todd
Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania
Decision date
September 24, 2014
Procedural posture
Direct appeal from the Washington County Court of Common Pleas' denial of relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act in a capital case.
Standard of review
The court reviewed whether the PCRA court's determination was supported by the record and free of legal error. Ineffectiveness claims were evaluated under the Pennsylvania tripartite formulation of arguable merit, lack of a reasonable basis, and prejudice, derived from Strickland and Pierce.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Michelle Sue Tharp v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

state post-conviction reliefineffective assistancesentencingdue processevidence

Practice areas

criminal procedurepost-conviction reliefcapital sentencingineffective assistance of counselconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose impeachment and exculpatory evidence concerning prosecution witnesses.
  2. Whether trial counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest based on prior representation of prosecution witnesses.
  3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a diminished-capacity defense when Tharp denied killing her daughter.
  4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present various guilt-phase evidence and witnesses.
  5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Tharp's absence from purportedly critical stages of trial.
  6. Whether the cumulative effect of alleged guilt-phase errors warranted relief.
  7. Whether trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present available mental-health mitigation evidence.

Holdings

  1. Tharp was not entitled to PCRA relief because the record supported the PCRA court's finding that no undisclosed promise of leniency had been made to Bittinger, and any nondisclosure did not prejudice Tharp in light of the impeachment information presented and the substantial independent evidence of guilt.
  2. Tharp was not entitled to relief on Brady claims involving alleged suppression of criminal, medical, parole, and impeachment information concerning inmate witnesses or Carrie Tharp.
  3. Tharp failed to establish an actual conflict of interest or prejudice arising from counsel's prior representation of the inmate witnesses.
  4. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a diminished-capacity defense because Tharp denied killing her daughter and therefore did not concede the criminal liability required for that defense.
  5. Tharp was not entitled to guilt-phase PCRA relief because the challenged omissions either lacked arguable merit, lacked a reasonable-basis or prejudice showing, involved noncritical proceedings, or did not cumulatively undermine confidence in the verdict.
  6. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into and present available mental-health mitigation evidence during the penalty phase, and Tharp was entitled to a new penalty hearing.

Key quotations

The High Court opined that capital counsel has an obligation to investigate thoroughly and prepare mental health and other mitigation evidence (at 770-771)
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror at Appellant’s trial may have struck a different balance had such mental health mitigation evidence been presented. (at 774)

Factual background

Tharp was convicted of deliberately starving her seven-year-old daughter, Tausha Lee Lanham, who died severely malnourished after prolonged neglect and food deprivation. The prosecution presented testimony from family members, neighbors, inmates, and a medical examiner establishing that Tharp repeatedly withheld food and that the child's death resulted from starvation. During the penalty phase, counsel presented no witnesses or documentary mitigation evidence beyond a stipulation concerning Tharp's lack of prior criminal convictions and incorporation of guilt-phase evidence.

Procedural history

Tharp was convicted of first-degree murder, endangering the welfare of a child, and abuse of corpse, and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. After several PCRA evidentiary hearings, the Washington County Court of Common Pleas denied relief. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed denial of the guilt-phase claims but reversed denial of the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mental-health mitigation during the penalty phase.

Remand instructions

Remand for a new penalty-phase hearing. The denial of relief on the guilt-phase claims remains affirmed; jurisdiction was relinquished.

Court Document

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