Commonwealth v. Packer

168 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2017) · Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · August 22, 2017

Summary

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence supported Danielle Nicole Packer’s convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault after she inhaled difluoroethane and caused a fatal vehicle collision. The court reaffirmed that driving under the influence ordinarily constitutes ordinary recklessness rather than malice, but concluded that Packer’s prior loss of consciousness from huffing and knowledge of the immediate effects established the heightened recklessness required for malice.

Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Writing for the Court
Justice Donohue; Chief Justice Saylor; Justice Baer; Justice Todd; Justice Dougherty; Justice Wecht; Justice Mundy
Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania
Decision date
August 22, 2017
Procedural posture
Packer appealed from convictions for third-degree murder and aggravated assault, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the malice mens rea. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allowance of appeal from the Superior Court's affirmance.
Standard of review
The sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law reviewed de novo, with plenary scope of review. The evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner to determine whether the evidence supports every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion
Parties
Danielle Nicole Packer v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal proceduremens reaevidenceburden of proof

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurevehicular homicideaggravated assaultevidence sufficiency

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Packer acted with malice, as required for third-degree murder and aggravated assault, when she drove after inhaling DFE despite knowing that huffing could cause her to lose consciousness.
  2. Whether ordinary recklessness associated with driving under the influence is distinguishable from the heightened recklessness constituting malice.

Holdings

  1. The decision to drive while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance does not, standing alone, constitute malice; ordinary recklessness is insufficient to establish the malice required for third-degree murder or aggravated assault.
  2. The evidence was sufficient to establish malice because Packer knowingly drove immediately after inhaling DFE despite knowing that its effects on her were immediate and debilitating and that it had previously caused her to lose consciousness.

Key quotations

Malice is a legal term, implying much more. It comprehends not only a particular ill-will, but every case where there is wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be injured. (168 A.3d at 168)
The mens rea generally associated with the decision to drive under the influence is ordinary recklessness and does not constitute malice. (168 A.3d at 170)
There is a significant difference between deciding to drive while intoxicated and deciding to drive with knowledge that there is a strong likelihood of becoming unconscious. (168 A.3d at 172)

Factual background

Packer inhaled difluoroethane from aerosol dust remover immediately before driving and again while operating her vehicle at a red light. She knew from prior experiences that huffing caused immediate, debilitating effects and had previously caused her to lose consciousness. Shortly after the second inhalation, Packer became unconscious while driving, crossed into oncoming traffic, and collided head-on with Matthew Snyder's vehicle, killing Snyder and seriously injuring Packer's passenger. Evidence showed that Packer later admitted she knew inhaling the product could kill her and that she had previously blacked out from huffing.

Procedural history

A jury convicted Packer of all charged offenses except aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of ten to twenty years of incarceration. The trial court denied Packer's post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of malice. The Superior Court affirmed, concluding that Packer's knowledge that huffing DFE could cause her to lose consciousness supported malice. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court.

Court Document

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