Summary
In this concurring opinion, Justice Wecht addresses the legality of Bryan Hill’s sentence for multiple DUI convictions arising from the same criminal episode. The opinion explains that the sentence for the lower-graded DUI offense must merge with the sentence for DUI involving refusal of chemical testing under Pennsylvania’s merger statute and the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Because no lawful separate sentence could be imposed for the lower-graded offense, the court’s vacatur without remand for resentencing was appropriate.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court lacked discretion to deviate from the mandatory sentencing scheme applicable to Hill's second DUI-general-impairment conviction.
- Whether the sentence for the lower-graded DUI-general-impairment offense had to merge with the sentence for the refusal-based DUI offense because both convictions arose from the same criminal act and the latter offense contained all of the former offense's elements.
- Whether vacatur without remand for resentencing was appropriate when no lawful separate sentence could be imposed for Count 2.
Holdings
- The trial court lacked discretion to deviate from the mandatory sentencing scheme applicable to Hill's second DUI-general-impairment conviction, and the resulting sentence was illegal.
- The sentence for the generic DUI-general-impairment offense had to merge with the sentence for the refusal-based DUI offense because the convictions arose from the same criminal act and the refusal-based offense contained all of the elements of the generic offense.
- Vacatur without a concomitant remand for resentencing was appropriate because no lawful separate sentence could be imposed for Count 2.
Key quotations
“No crime shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crime shall arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.” (2)
“Because the generic penalty for DUI– general impairment under subsection 3804(a)(1) does not contain an element that is absent from subsection 3804(c)(1), the sentencing scheme imposed upon Hill survives neither the same-elements test under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Pennsylvania merger statute.” (3)
Factual background
Hill was convicted of two DUI-related offenses arising from the same criminal act. One count involved DUI-general impairment under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(a)(1), and the other involved refusal of chemical testing under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(c)(1). The sentence imposed for the generic DUI offense was unlawful because the sentencing scheme required by the Vehicle Code did not permit the trial court to impose that separate sentence, and the generic DUI offense also merged with the refusal-based offense for sentencing purposes.
Procedural history
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered judgment of sentence on December 20, 2016. The Superior Court affirmed that judgment on February 22, 2019. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted review, and Justice Wecht concurred in the majority's disposition, agreeing that Hill's sentence for Count 2 had to be vacated without a remand for resentencing.
Remand instructions
No remand for resentencing; the sentence for Count 2 was to be vacated because no lawful separate sentence could be imposed.