Summary
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Michael John Parrish’s Rule 1925(b) statement was so vague that it waived all claims on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. The Court further held that appellate counsel’s filing of a woefully deficient statement constituted per se ineffective assistance, warranting reinstatement of Parrish’s right to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. The case was remanded to the PCRA court for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a vague Rule 1925(b) statement that fails to identify particular claims waives all appellate claims, even when the PCRA court issues an opinion addressing some claims.
- Whether appellate or PCRA counsel's filing of a Rule 1925(b) statement so vague that it waives all appellate issues constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se.
- Whether the appropriate remedy is reinstatement of the appellant's right to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and preparation of a new Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Holdings
- A Rule 1925(b) statement that does not identify specific legal errors or the particular PCRA rulings being challenged fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), and all appellate issues not properly identified are waived under Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii).
- When PCRA counsel files a Rule 1925(b) statement so deficient that it completely forfeits the petitioner's right to appellate review of collateral claims, counsel's performance constitutes ineffective assistance per se.
- Where PCRA counsel's deficient performance completely deprives a petitioner of appellate review, the proper remedy is remand for restoration of appellate rights, including the filing of a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and a new Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Key quotations
“Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (“Rule 1925(b) statement”) is so vague as to render all of his claims waived for purposes of this appeal.” (at 1)
“Additionally, we hold that appellate counsel’s filing of a woefully deficient statement, one which precludes merits review of all appellate issues, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se, warranting reinstatement of Appellant’s right to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc.” (at 1)
“Consequently, in the present case, PCRA counsel’s filing of a vague Rule 1925(b) statement, which has completely forfeited Appellant’s right to appellate review of all of his collateral claims, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel per se.” (at 31)
Factual background
Parrish shot and killed his girlfriend, Victoria Adams, and their 19-month-old son, Sidney Parrish, in their Monroe County apartment on July 6, 2009. After the shootings, Parrish fled Pennsylvania, was arrested in New Hampshire, and confessed after waiving his Miranda rights. He was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and received two death sentences. In his PCRA proceedings, appointed counsel filed multiple generalized and inadequately developed ineffective-assistance claims and later filed a three-paragraph Rule 1925(b) statement that did not identify the specific PCRA rulings being challenged.
Procedural history
Parrish was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. His automatic capital review resulted in affirmance of the convictions and sentences, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denied Parrish's PCRA claims. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that PCRA counsel's Rule 1925(b) statement was so vague that all claims were waived, but that counsel's deficient filing constituted ineffective assistance per se. The Court remanded for a new Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and a new Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Remand instructions
The PCRA court must permit Parrish to file a new Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc and then file a new Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the issues identified in that statement. Jurisdiction was relinquished.