Summary
Justice Wecht dissents from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority's disposition concerning a belated restitution order in Commonwealth v. Cochran. The dissent concludes that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution more than thirty days after sentencing because restitution must be specified at the time of sentencing under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(2). It would reverse the Superior Court's vacatur of the original sentence, strike the untimely restitution order, and affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to impose restitution for the first time more than thirty days after imposing the judgment of sentence.
- Whether Pennsylvania's restitution statute requires the amount and method of restitution to be specified at the time of sentencing.
- Whether the Superior Court properly vacated the entire judgment of sentence or instead should have struck only the untimely restitution order.
Holdings
- The trial court lacked jurisdiction to substantively alter the judgment of sentence by imposing restitution for the first time after the thirty-day period for trial-court modification had expired. The belated restitution order was therefore ultra vires.
- Section 1106(c)(2) requires the sentencing court to specify the amount and method of restitution at the time of sentencing; restitution may not be bifurcated from the remainder of the judgment of sentence and imposed later.
- The proper remedy would have been to reverse the Superior Court's vacatur of the judgment of sentence, strike the trial court's belated restitution order, and affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.
Key quotations
“Section 1106(c)(2) of the Crimes Code is clear and unambiguous: a trial court “shall specify the amount and method of restitution” and it shall do so “[a]t the time of sentencing.”” (1)
“Once the latter period elapsed, the court lacked jurisdiction to take any further action on the case.” (2)
“Section 1106 itself plainly forecloses bifurcating the statutorily mandated restitution order from the remainder of a judgment of sentence.” (5)
“When a sentencing court errs, its mess may not be cleaned up on the back of the defendant.” (6)
Factual background
At Cochran's guilty plea and sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth and defense acknowledged that the final restitution amount was approximately $65,000, subject to disputes over whether certain listed items belonged to Cochran. The trial court imposed imprisonment and court costs on June 29, 2017, but did not impose restitution or defer sentencing until the amount was resolved. More than thirty days later, after the judgment of sentence had become final, the trial court held restitution hearings and entered an order imposing restitution.
Procedural history
On June 29, 2017, the York County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Cochran to imprisonment and court costs but did not impose restitution, despite the parties' acknowledgment that the amount was approximately $65,000. After the statutory post-sentence and trial-court modification periods expired, the trial court conducted restitution hearings and entered a restitution order. Cochran appealed that order, and the Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing. Justice Wecht dissented from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's disposition, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose restitution belatedly and that the Superior Court should have struck only the restitution order.
Remand instructions
The dissent would reverse the Superior Court's vacatur, strike the trial court's belated restitution order, and affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.