Summary
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a defendants’ pretrial memorandum seeking dismissal based on legal authorities and materials outside the pleadings was properly treated as a motion for summary judgment. The trial justice erred by ruling on the motion without providing the plaintiff the required ten-day opportunity to respond under Rule 56. The court sustained the appeal, vacated the Superior Court judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial justice erred by treating defendants' pretrial memorandum as a motion for summary judgment without giving plaintiff the required ten-day notice and opportunity to respond.
- Whether the statement in the employment reference was defamatory per se.
Holdings
- The memorandum could not properly be treated as a Rule 50 motion because Rule 50 may be asserted only during or after trial, and it could not be treated as a motion to dismiss because the trial justice considered matters outside the pleadings. The request for dismissal without trial based on legal authorities and documentary materials sounded in summary judgment.
- Once the trial justice determined that the pretrial memorandum sounded in summary judgment, he was required to ensure that plaintiff received the applicable statutory notice and ten-day opportunity to prepare and file a response. Failure to do so was reversible error.
- The court did not reach the substantive defamation-per-se issue because the notice violation was dispositive.
- A trial justice may determine before trial whether a communication is defamatory per se, because whether a particular communication is defamatory is a question of law for the court; however, the determination must occur after the parties receive the procedural opportunity required by the applicable rule.
Key quotations
“Indeed, summary judgment is a proper vehicle for a trial justice to determine whether a particular statement is defamatory per se.” (24)
“Thus, the trial justice in this case erred, since he proceeded to hear the merits of the motion, without giving plaintiff ten days to prepare and file a response to the memorandum.” (24-25)
“Whether the meaning of a particular communication is defamatory is a question of law for the court to decide rather than a factual issue for a jury to determine.” (25)
Factual background
Paula Kevorkian, a licensed practical nurse, worked at Pawtuxet Village Nursing and Rehabilitation Center until she resigned after being accused of insubordination for failing to dispense necessary medication. When a placement agency later contacted the nursing home for a reference, Judith Glass provided a reference describing Kevorkian's work practices as unacceptable. The placement agency informed Kevorkian that the negative reference caused it not to hire her, prompting her defamation action.
Procedural history
Paula Kevorkian sued defendants for defamation based on a negative employment reference. On the eve of trial, defendants submitted a pretrial memorandum seeking dismissal without trial or, alternatively, judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice treated the memorandum as a summary-judgment motion, considered materials outside the pleadings, and granted it without giving plaintiff the statutory ten-day opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island sustained the appeal, vacated the judgment, and remanded.
Remand instructions
The Superior Court was instructed to treat defendants' memorandum as a motion for summary judgment after all parties had been given a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.