Laurence v. Sollitto

Summary

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed dismissal of Norman Laurence's claims against his court-appointed criminal defense attorney. The court held that appointed defense counsel does not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Laurence's civil rights claims were also barred because his conviction had not been overturned. The court further held that the legal malpractice complaint failed to plead the required causation element and did not establish a cognizable negligence claim.

Holdings

1. A court-appointed attorney performing the traditional functions of defense counsel is not acting under color of state law merely because the attorney was appointed by a court; therefore, the attorney is not subject to a § 1983 damages action on that basis.
2. Before a litigant may institute a § 1983 claim for constitutional deprivations connected to a criminal prosecution, the conviction must first be overturned on direct appeal or in collateral proceedings when success on the claim would imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence.
3. The malpractice complaint failed to state a claim because it did not allege the required causation element, including that Laurence's alleged attorney negligence caused the wrongful conviction or that he was innocent of the underlying charges.
4. Any error in considering extraneous materials without first giving Laurence a reasonable opportunity to respond was harmless because the fatal defects in the complaint were apparent from its face.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Laurence's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against his court-appointed defense attorney stated a cognizable claim when the attorney was not acting under color of state law.
2. Whether Laurence could maintain a § 1983 damages action attacking the validity of his conviction while the conviction remained unreversed and the criminal appeal was pending.
3. Whether Laurence's attorney-malpractice complaint stated a claim when it failed to allege the causation requirement that the attorney's negligence caused the wrongful conviction or that Laurence was innocent of the underlying crimes.
4. Whether the Superior Court improperly considered extraneous materials in deciding the Rule 12(b)(6) motion without first giving Laurence a reasonable opportunity to respond.

Disposition

affirmed