Summary
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed a termination-of-parental-rights decree involving a cognitively impaired mother and her two children, as well as the Department of Children, Youth and Families' petition concerning visitation during the mother's appeal. The court held that DCYF failed to make reasonable efforts tailored to the mother's mental deficiency and parenting needs before seeking termination, and that the Family Court improperly relied on the children's best interests before establishing parental unfitness. The court affirmed the termination decree on an alternative statutory ground involving services addressing relationship and parenting problems resulting from abusive relationships, and dismissed the visitation petition as moot.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether DCYF made the reasonable efforts required before terminating parental rights on the former mental-deficiency ground in § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i).
- Whether, under § 15-7-7(a)(3), DCYF offered or provided reasonable services designed to correct the situations that led to the children's placement in DCYF care.
- Whether the Family Court's termination decree could be affirmed under § 15-7-7(a)(3) despite inadequate services addressing Mary Ann's cognitive limitations and parenting skills.
- Whether DCYF's certiorari petition concerning unilateral suspension of visitation during the appeal presented a live controversy.
Holdings
- When DCYF seeks termination under former § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) based on a parent's mental deficiency, it must demonstrate reasonable efforts specifically addressing the parent's mental deficiency and its effect on parenting, including services appropriate to the parent's particular cognitive needs.
- Section 15-7-7(a)(3) requires DCYF to make reasonable efforts to offer or provide services designed to correct the particular situation that led to the children's placement, even though § 15-7-7(b)(1) does not expressly list subsection (a)(3).
- DCYF did not provide reasonable services addressing Mary Ann's cognitive impairment and parenting deficiencies, but that error did not require reversal of the § 15-7-7(a)(3) termination because DCYF reasonably addressed the separate situation involving her abusive relationships and resulting inability to provide a safe home.
- The certiorari petition concerning DCYF's suspension of visitation during the mother's appeal was moot because DCYF had obtained the requested suspension through a separate Family Court motion and the mother did not appeal that order.
Key quotations
“Because DCYF made no such showing of reasonable efforts to address Mary Ann's mental impairment in this case and because the trial justice misapplied the standards set forth above, we hold that the trial justice overlooked material evidence and was clearly wrong in his finding that DCYF undertook reasonable efforts under § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) to reunify Mary Ann and her children.” (at 313)
“As a result, we reaffirm our previous holdings in In re Briana D. and In re Joseph S., and conclude that § 15-7-7(a)(3) does require a showing that the services offered amount to reasonable efforts on the part of the agency to correct the situation that led to the children's removal from the parental home, thereby strengthening and encouraging the parental relationship, as described in § 15-7-7(b)(1).” (at 315)
“Thus, we deny the petition and quash the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.” (at 320)
Factual background
DCYF removed Christopher B. and Kayla R. from Mary Ann R.'s home after finding the home filthy and the children dirty and bruised. Evaluations determined that Mary Ann had mild mental retardation and required specialized parenting education and cognitive-behavioral services, but DCYF did not provide those recommended services before filing the termination petition. Mary Ann also remained involved in abusive relationships that exposed the children to unsafe conditions, despite receiving marriage counseling and related assistance addressing those relationships.
Procedural history
The Family Court terminated Mary Ann R.'s parental rights under former G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) and (a)(3), after finding that DCYF had made reasonable efforts and that termination was in the children's best interests. During the appeal, DCYF initially suspended visitation without a further court order, but the Family Court ordered visitation restored and later granted DCYF's separate motion to suspend visitation. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the termination decree insofar as it rested on mental-deficiency grounds, affirmed termination under § 15-7-7(a)(3) on a different basis, and denied and quashed the certiorari proceeding as moot.
Remand instructions
The court denied the certiorari petition as moot, quashed the writ as improvidently granted, and returned the papers to the Family Court with the decision endorsed thereon. It reversed and vacated the mental-deficiency portion of the termination decree but affirmed termination under § 15-7-7(a)(3).