Summary
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed Ralph Thibedau’s convictions for three counts of child molestation. The court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of uncharged sexual acts under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 404(b), giving the related jury instructions, or allowing testimony from a previously undisclosed witness. The court also rejected the defendant’s arguments concerning duplicity and discovery violations.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial justice abused his discretion by admitting evidence of more than one hundred uncharged sexual acts under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
- Whether the trial justice erred by permitting Donna Hogan to testify despite the state's failure to identify her in its discovery response or provide a conventional witness statement.
- Whether the trial justice improperly limited cross-examination of Hogan concerning specific instances bearing on Stephanie's character for untruthfulness under Rule 608(b)(2).
- Whether Hogan's testimony concerning Stephanie's conduct, body language, and demeanor was inadmissible lay opinion under Rule 701.
- Whether count one was duplicitous because the evidence referred to numerous sexual acts occurring during the charged time period.
- Whether the jury instructions were deficient because they did not define the victim's age for purposes of the child-molestation statutes.
- Whether the trial justice failed to include a proper written instruction limiting the jury's use of Rule 404(b) evidence, and whether that issue was preserved.
Holdings
- The trial justice did not abuse his discretion by admitting testimony concerning more than one hundred uncharged sexual acts involving the same complaining witness. The evidence was relevant to permissible purposes, including defendant's lewd disposition, intent, motive, and common plan, was reasonably necessary to the state's case, and was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
- The jury instruction was proper because it prohibited use of the uncharged acts to establish bad character or propensity and identified specific permissible uses: motive, intent, absence of mistake, and lewd disposition toward Stephanie.
- The trial justice did not err by allowing Donna Hogan to testify despite the state's failure to list her in its witness disclosure because the discovery materials provided sufficient notice of her anticipated testimony and defendant failed to establish procedural prejudice.
- The trial justice did not abuse his discretion by preventing defense counsel from questioning Hogan about specific instances of Stephanie's untruthfulness because Hogan had not testified on direct examination about Stephanie's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
- Hogan's testimony concerning her observations of Stephanie's behavior and her conclusion that Stephanie was scared to death was admissible lay opinion under Rule 701.
- Count one was not duplicitous, and the trial justice properly denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.
- The trial justice did not commit reversible error by declining to give a separate definition of age because the evidence established a clear timeline and presented no genuine issue about whether the charged conduct occurred while Stephanie was within the statutory age ranges.
Key quotations
“Other-acts evidence should be excluded if it is merely cumulative. * * * Second, the evidence is only to be admitted when the exception is relevant to proving the charges lodged against the defendant. * * * Finally, a trial court should designate with particularity the specific exception to which the evidence is relevant and instruct the jury concerning the limited use for which the evidence is to be considered.” (-7-)
“In its charge the trial court should not take a scatter-shot approach and list all of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Rather, it shall designate with particularity the specific exceptions to which the ‘other crimes’ evidence is relevant and delete from its charge the remaining exceptions.” (-10-)
Factual background
The defendant was accused of sexually abusing his stepdaughter, Stephanie, beginning when she was thirteen years old and continuing over approximately three years. Stephanie testified that defendant engaged in sexual contact and penetration with her and offered cigarettes, alcohol, or marijuana in exchange for sexual activity. The charged conduct involved three specified periods in 2009 and 2011-2012, while the state also introduced testimony that more than one hundred similar uncharged sexual acts occurred during the same general period. The defense challenged the admission of the uncharged-acts evidence, the testimony of Stephanie's aunt Donna Hogan, the limits on cross-examination, the testimony concerning Stephanie's demeanor, the alleged duplicity of count one, and the jury instructions.
Procedural history
A Kent County indictment charged defendant with first-, second-, and third-degree child molestation arising from sexual conduct involving his stepdaughter. The Superior Court denied defendant's motions to sever and dismiss for duplicity, admitted evidence of uncharged sexual conduct under Rule 404(b), permitted an undisclosed witness to testify, limited cross-examination concerning the complaining witness's truthfulness, denied a motion for judgment of acquittal, and gave the challenged jury instructions. The jury returned guilty verdicts, defendant was sentenced, judgment was entered on January 13, 2015, and he timely appealed. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.
Remand instructions
The record was ordered returned to the Superior Court.