Bray v. Marathon Corp., 356 S.C. 111

588 S.E.2d 93 (2003) · Supreme Court of South Carolina · October 13, 2003 · No. No. 25733

Summary

The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a person operating a defective trash compactor may pursue strict liability and negligence claims for physical injuries arising from emotional trauma after witnessing a coworker’s death. The court concluded that the bystander limitations in Kinard did not bar the strict liability claim and that the negligence claim could also proceed because the operator was a foreseeable direct victim; the warranty claims remained abandoned.

Holdings

  1. The Kinard bystander analysis does not apply to a strict-liability products claim brought by a person who used the defective product. A user of a defective product is a primary and direct victim of the product defect rather than a mere bystander, regardless of the user's relationship to the person injured or killed.
  2. Bray's alleged physical injuries arising from emotional trauma could constitute physical harm, and the record presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the compactor incident was the proximate cause of that harm.
  3. A plaintiff treated as a direct and foreseeable victim because she used the product for strict-liability purposes must also be treated as a direct and foreseeable victim for a negligence-based products-liability claim arising from the same incident. The trial court therefore improperly granted summary judgment on Bray's negligence claim.
  4. The warranty claims were abandoned because Bray did not present an argument concerning them on appeal.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the bystander limitations recognized in Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co. applied to Marilyn Bray's strict-liability products claim.
  2. Whether Bray's alleged physical injuries resulting from emotional trauma were sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact on proximate cause for her strict-liability claim.
  3. Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on Bray's negligence-based products-liability claim because she was not a foreseeable direct victim under the bystander analysis.
  4. Whether the warranty claims were abandoned because Bray did not present an argument concerning them on appeal.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (14)

  • Bray v. Marathon Corp., 347 S.C. 189, 553 S.E.2d 477 (Ct. App. 2001)(reviewed)
  • Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985)(distinguished)
  • Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 344 S.C. 266, 543 S.E.2d 264 (Ct. App. 2001)(followed)
  • Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983)(followed)
  • Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983)(followed)
  • Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 494 S.E.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1997)(followed)
  • Livingston v. Noland Corp., 293 S.C. 521, 362 S.E.2d 16 (1987)(followed)
  • Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 560 S.E.2d 606 (2002)(followed)
  • Spaugh v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 158 S.C. 25, 155 S.E. 145 (1930)(followed)
  • Mack v. South-Bound R. Co., 52 S.C. 323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898)(followed)

Showing top 10 of 14.

Cited In (0)

No citing cases on record yet.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…