Darious Wilcox v. State of Florida; Darious Wilcox v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Summary

The Florida Supreme Court reviews Darious Wilcox’s appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and his separate petition for habeas corpus. The court rejects his claims of ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel and denies habeas relief, affirming the circuit court’s order.

Holdings

1. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to spend more time preparing, interview additional witnesses, or conduct a more extensive pretrial mitigation investigation. Wilcox's own decision to discharge counsel and proceed pro se materially reduced the time available for preparation, and he failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice.
2. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present additional background witnesses because their testimony was cumulative of the mitigation presented at trial and the Spencer hearing. Wilcox also failed to show a reasonable probability of a different sentence.
3. Counsel was not ineffective for relying on qualified experts and declining to present additional psychological testing or more favorable postconviction expert testimony. Wilcox failed to establish deficient performance or penalty-phase prejudice.
4. Counsel reasonably stipulated to Wilcox's prior convictions while arguing against the prior-violent-felony aggravator; counsel was not ineffective for declining to call a codefendant whose testimony could have exposed damaging details about the prior crimes.
5. The circuit court properly summarily denied Wilcox's claim that counsel failed to investigate or challenge his competency to waive counsel. The record showed that Wilcox was examined by a qualified expert who found him competent, and counsel was entitled to rely on that determination.
6. State v. Poole governs Wilcox's Hurst claim. The Sixth and Eighth Amendments do not require the jury to make the sufficiency or weighing determinations under Florida's capital-sentencing statute or to make any sentencing recommendation; the jury need only unanimously find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. That requirement was satisfied by Wilcox's guilt-phase convictions for armed kidnapping and armed robbery and related firearm findings.
7. Applying Poole to Wilcox did not violate due process, create an unconstitutional class of one, or violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Poole did not retroactively criminalize conduct and was no more onerous than the capital-sentencing law in effect when Wilcox committed the crimes.
8. Wilcox's Brady and Giglio claims were procedurally barred because he attempted to relabel previously rejected direct-appeal discovery claims. They also failed on the merits because the State did not possess transcripts that it failed to disclose and Wilcox did not allege that the prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony.
9. The circuit court properly summarily denied Wilcox's newly discovered evidence claim because a laboratory notice concerning another inmate did not establish that the challenged DNA procedure was used in Wilcox's case and would not probably produce an acquittal on retrial.
10. Wilcox failed to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because the omitted claims were procedurally barred, meritless, unsupported by precedent, or involved errors already determined to be harmless.
11. Wilcox's 1993 murder and armed-robbery convictions supported the prior-violent-felony aggravator even though he was not the shooter. By taking money from the victim, Wilcox exerted force and had the required direct contact with the victim.

Questions Presented

1. Whether penalty-phase counsel rendered ineffective assistance by inadequately preparing, presenting cumulative background evidence, presenting insufficient mental-health evidence, or failing to challenge the prior-violent-felony aggravator.
2. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or challenge Wilcox's competency to waive counsel and represent himself during the guilt phase.
3. Whether Wilcox was entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, including whether State v. Poole was wrongly decided or could be applied retroactively.
4. Whether the State's failure to transcribe witness statements violated Brady v. Maryland or Giglio v. United States.
5. Whether a laboratory notice concerning DNA analysis constituted newly discovered evidence warranting relief under Jones v. State.
6. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims involving competency to proceed pro se, the in-the-course-of-a-felony aggravator, the Simmons rule, due process, effective cross-examination, or confrontation.
7. Whether Wilcox's prior convictions supported the prior-violent-felony aggravator despite his contention that he did not directly shoot or otherwise directly contact the victim.

Disposition

affirmed