Summary
The Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether family members who did not witness an accident itself may pursue negligent infliction of emotional distress claims after observing the injured person at the accident scene shortly afterward. The court held that a plaintiff may proceed upon showing a serious injury or apparent death caused by the defendant’s negligence, a close and intimate relationship with the injured person, observation of the injury at the scene before material alteration, and resulting serious or severe emotional injury. The court affirmed that the mother and brother of the injured child had stated prima facie claims against the driver’s uninsured motorist insurer.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a plaintiff pursuing negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander must have seen or heard the injury-producing accident itself.
- Whether a close family member who arrives at the accident scene shortly afterward and observes the injured person before the scene has materially changed may pursue a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
- Whether summary judgment was proper when the undisputed evidence showed that Karen Eskin and Logan Eskin observed Brendan's serious injuries at the scene shortly after the accident but did not perceive the collision itself.
Holdings
- A plaintiff need not see or hear the injury-producing accident itself to pursue a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim when the plaintiff observes the injured person's actual or apparent death or serious physical injury at the accident scene shortly afterward, before the scene has been materially altered.
- Such a claim requires proof of: (1) the actual or apparent death or serious physical injury of another caused by the defendant's negligence; (2) a close and intimate personal relationship between the plaintiff and the injured or deceased person; (3) the plaintiff's observation of the death or serious injury at the accident scene before the scene has been materially altered; and (4) a serious or severe emotional injury caused by that observation.
- Karen Eskin and Logan Eskin stated prima facie negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims because they alleged Brendan's serious injury was caused by negligence, had close and intimate relationships with him, observed him seriously injured at the accident scene shortly afterward before it materially changed, and suffered severe or serious emotional injuries as a result.
Key quotations
“When a plaintiff did not witness the injury-producing event, the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires proof of the following elements: (1) the actual or apparent death or serious physical injury of another caused by the defendant’s negligence, (2) the existence of a close and intimate personal relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased or injured person, (3) the plaintiffs observation of the actual or apparent death or serious physical injury at the scene of the accident before the scene has been materially altered, and (4) the resulting serious or severe emotional injury to the plaintiff caused by the observation of the death or injury.” (262 S.W.3d at 739)
“In light of our express desire to fashion objective standards that can be used at the prima facie stage to separate meritorious from nonmeritorious claims, Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d at 445; Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d at 594, we have incorporated the objective standards as integral elements of the cause of action.” (262 S.W.3d at 740)
Factual background
Alice Bartee lost control of her automobile while attempting to park at an elementary school and struck Brendan Eskin, causing serious and permanent brain injuries. Brendan's mother, Karen Eskin, and his brother, Logan Eskin, arrived at the school shortly afterward and saw him lying apparently lifeless in a pool of blood at the accident scene, before he had been moved or the scene materially altered. Neither Karen nor Logan saw or heard the automobile strike Brendan. They alleged severe emotional injuries caused by observing Brendan's condition.
Procedural history
The Eskins sued Alice Bartee and other defendants after Bartee's automobile struck Brendan Eskin at an elementary-school pickup area. Because Bartee lacked adequate insurance, the Eskins served the complaint on USAA under Tennessee's uninsured-motorist statutes. The trial court granted USAA partial summary judgment on Karen Eskin's and Logan Eskin's negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims and designated the order final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted USAA's Rule 11 application and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on Karen Eskin's and Logan Eskin's negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims.