Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al.

Summary

The Tennessee Supreme Court held that a non-manufacturing seller of asbestos-containing products could be sued in strict liability under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) because the manufacturers were not subject to service of process due to bankruptcy-related automatic stays. The Court also held that the trial court’s jury instruction improperly applied the learned intermediary doctrine and incorrectly identified the employer, rather than the employee, as the consumer who required a warning. Because the instructional error more probably than not affected the verdict, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court and remanded for a new trial.

Holdings

1. A non-manufacturing seller may be sued in strict liability when the product manufacturers are not subject to service of process in Tennessee. The bankruptcy petitions, automatic stays, and confirmed-plan channeling injunctions established that the relevant manufacturers were not subject to service of process, satisfying the statutory prerequisite.
2. The learned intermediary doctrine does not apply to a products-liability action involving asbestos or another highly toxic substance purchased by an employer and used by an employee in the workplace. The employee, not the employer, is the consumer to whom the warning duty is directed.
3. Although the jury could consider DuPont's conduct in determining cause in fact, DuPont's knowledge of asbestos dangers did not make DuPont the sole cause of Nye's injuries or eliminate North Brothers' potential liability for failure to warn.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a non-manufacturing seller may be sued in strict liability under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-28-106(b) when the manufacturers of the products are not subject to service of process because of bankruptcy-related automatic stays or channeling injunctions.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that the seller could not be liable for failure to warn if DuPont, the employer, knew of the dangers or had received adequate warnings.
3. Whether DuPont's knowledge of asbestos dangers made DuPont the sole cause in fact of Nye's injuries.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded