Summary
The Texas Fourth Court of Appeals considers whether a 1956 oil and gas deed reserved a fixed 3/32 nonparticipating royalty interest or a floating 3/4 interest. Applying the presumption discussed in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, the court concludes that the deed reserved a floating 3/4 royalty interest, reverses the trial court’s judgment, renders judgment for the Hoffmans, and remands for determination of costs and attorney’s fees.
Holdings
- The Van Dyke presumption applies when an oil-and-gas deed reserves a royalty interest using a double fraction involving 1/8; the presumption is not limited to mineral-estate reservations or to instruments from a particular historical period.
- The deed's text does not rebut the Van Dyke presumption. The references to the usual one-eighth royalty support, rather than defeat, the conclusion that 1/8 was used as a placeholder for the landowner's royalty.
- The 1956 deed reserved a floating three-fourths nonparticipating royalty interest, consisting of three-fourths of any royalty reserved in an oil, gas, or mineral lease affecting the property, rather than a fixed 3/32 royalty interest.
- The trial court's judgment must be reversed in its entirety, judgment must be rendered construing the deed as reserving a floating 3/4 nonparticipating royalty interest, and the cause must be remanded for the trial court to determine costs and any reasonable and necessary attorney's fees.
Questions Presented
- Whether the 1956 deed's double-fraction language triggered the Van Dyke presumption that 1/8 was used as a term of art referring to the usual landowner's royalty rather than an arithmetic value.
- Whether the nature of the reserved interest as a nonparticipating royalty, the deed's 1956 date, the repeated use of 3/32, an existing 1/10 royalty on other minerals, or the grantors' relinquishment of future bonus rights rebutted the Van Dyke presumption.
- Whether the deed reserved a fixed 3/32 nonparticipating royalty interest or a floating 3/4 nonparticipating royalty interest.
- Whether the trial court's judgment and attorney's-fee award should be reversed and what matters should be remanded.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (30)
- Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)(followed)
- Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 (1960)(followed)
- Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996)(followed)
- Hoffman v. Thomson, 630 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021), vacated sub nom. Thomson v. Hoffman, 674 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. 2023)(vacated)
- Thomson v. Hoffman, 674 S.W.3d 927 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam)(followed)
- Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023)(followed)
- U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC v. Laborde Properties, L.P., 551 S.W.3d 148, 152-54 (Tex. 2018)(followed)
- Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016)(followed)
- ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 874 (Tex. 2018)(followed)
- Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. 2017)(followed)
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