George Michael Welch v. Felix Lopez and Summerlyn Lopez

No. 04-24-00366-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 15, 2026) · Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio · April 15, 2026 · No. No. 04-24-00366-CV

Summary

The Texas Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in a dispute arising from an owner-financed commercial property agreement. The court held that the seller was not entitled to attorney’s fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 because he was not a prevailing party: the temporary injunction and payment required to reinstate the note did not materially alter the parties’ legal relationship. The court also upheld the trial court’s interpretation that foreclosure proceedings could not begin until the buyer was 91 days late and its finding that the seller unjustifiably refused the buyer’s tender of payment.

Holdings

  1. Welch was not entitled to attorney's fees because he failed to establish that he was the prevailing party on his contract claim.
  2. Obtaining a temporary injunction cannot, by itself, form the basis for an award of attorney's fees under chapter 38.
  3. The order requiring the Lopezes to pay $22,221.92 as a condition of reinstating the note did not make Welch a prevailing party.
  4. The contract prohibited Welch from initiating foreclosure proceedings until the Lopezes were 91 days late on a payment.
  5. Legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the findings that Welch unjustifiably refused the Lopezes' payment and acted unfairly and inequitably.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Welch was entitled to attorney's fees under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 despite not obtaining monetary damages or other relief that materially altered the parties' legal relationship.
  2. Whether obtaining a temporary injunction and recovering personal property before trial made Welch a prevailing party for purposes of section 38.001.
  3. Whether the trial court's order requiring the Lopezes to pay $22,221.92 as a condition of reinstating the promissory note made Welch a prevailing party.
  4. Whether the trial court correctly interpreted the contract to prohibit Welch from initiating foreclosure proceedings before the Lopezes were 91 days late.
  5. Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court's findings that Welch unjustifiably refused the Lopezes' tender and that his conduct was unfair and inequitable.

Disposition

affirmed

Cases Cited (30)

  • 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. 2011)(followed)
  • Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015)(followed)
  • Dandachli v. Active Motorwerks, Inc., No. 03-19-00494-CV, 2021 WL 3118437, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 23, 2021, no pet.)(followed)
  • Intercontinental Grp. P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 652, 654-55 (Tex. 2009)(followed)
  • Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992)(followed)
  • Veasay v. Abbott, 13 F.4th 362 (5th Cir. 2021)(distinguished)
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2005)(followed)
  • Camarena v. Tex. Emp. Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)(followed)
  • Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 346 S.W.3d 769, 774-75 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)(followed)
  • Williams v. Houston Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund, 121 S.W.3d 415, 437 n.21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)(followed)

Showing top 10 of 30.

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