Dalila Agiza v. T-Slash-Bar Texas, Ltd.

No. 04-24-00704-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 29, 2026) · Texas Court of Appeals, Fourth District, San Antonio · May 29, 2026 · No. 04-24-00704-CV

Summary

The Fourth Court of Appeals of Texas partially affirmed and partially reversed orders concerning the dismissal of Dalila Agiza’s claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a and the vacatur of a temporary restraining order. The court held that the breach-of-contract and negligence claims were improperly dismissed, while affirming dismissal of the defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and racial discrimination claims. It also affirmed vacatur of the temporary restraining order because the district court lacked jurisdiction over issues within the justice court’s exclusive jurisdiction in the parallel forcible-detainer proceeding.

Holdings

  1. The trial court erred by dismissing Agiza's breach-of-contract claim because the claim was added in the live third amended petition and T-Slash-Bar did not amend its Rule 91a motion to challenge it.
  2. The trial court erred by dismissing Agiza's negligence claim because the live pleading alleged facts that, if taken as true, established a basis in law and fact for the claim.
  3. The trial court did not err by dismissing Agiza's defamation claim because the petition did not identify a defamatory statement made by T-Slash-Bar to a third party or provide sufficient facts identifying the alleged statements and their audience.
  4. The trial court did not err by dismissing Agiza's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because her allegations were conclusory and did not plead extreme and outrageous conduct or distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
  5. The trial court did not err by dismissing Agiza's civil-conspiracy claim because the petition did not include an actionable underlying tort that could support conspiracy liability.
  6. The trial court did not err by dismissing Agiza's racial-discrimination claim because she did not identify a recognized independent cause of action under Texas law or provide supporting statutory or common-law authority.
  7. The district court lacked jurisdiction to grant the TRO because the order addressed immediate possession in a forcible-detainer proceeding within the justice court's exclusive jurisdiction; the TRO was therefore void, and the trial court properly vacated it.
  8. The trial court properly dismissed the claims against the only parties properly before it because the record showed no citation, service, waiver, or appearance by the other named defendants.
  9. The trial court did not improperly delegate judicial authority by asking opposing counsel to draft proposed orders because the judge's signature ensured that the orders reflected the court's rulings.
  10. The trial court did not lack authority merely because another district judge ruled on matters in the case without a formal transfer order; Texas law permits district judges to exchange benches or hear cases for one another.
  11. The docket-sheet notation 'Final-Judgment-Non-Jury-Trial' did not deprive Agiza of a jury trial because docket entries are not judgments, and the Rule 91a dismissal occurred before trial when no material fact issue remained for a jury.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the trial court properly dismissed Agiza's claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a based on the live third amended petition.
  2. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing the newly added breach-of-contract claim when T-Slash-Bar's Rule 91a motion did not identify or challenge that claim.
  3. Whether Agiza's negligence pleading had a basis in law and fact under Rule 91a.
  4. Whether Agiza adequately pleaded defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, and racial discrimination claims.
  5. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order concerning possession of premises involved in a pending forcible-detainer action.
  6. Whether the trial court improperly dismissed claims against unserved defendants, allowed counsel to draft proposed orders, used Bexar County's central docket system, denied a jury trial, or failed to correct docket and record errors.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (33)

  • Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 270 (Tex. 2006)(followed)
  • Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Tex. 2025)(followed)
  • Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015)(followed)
  • City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016)(followed)
  • In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021)(followed)
  • Vasquez v. Legend Nat. Gas III, LP, 492 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied)(followed)
  • AMS Const. Co., Inc. v. K.H.K. Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 357 S.W.3d 30, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d)(followed)
  • Medfin Manager, LLC v. Stone, 613 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.)(followed)
  • Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2022)(followed)
  • Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014)(followed)

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