Ex parte Jesus De Leon

400 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) · Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 5, 2013 · No. AP-76,763 & AP-76,764

Summary

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether waiver of appeal was an element of Jesus De Leon’s plea agreements and whether the State breached those agreements by reindicting his brother. The court held that the record did not establish a binding waiver of appeal, that De Leon did not breach the agreements by appealing with the trial court’s permission, and that the State breached the agreements by reindicting his brother. Because specific performance was unavailable, the court set aside the convictions and remanded De Leon to answer the original charges.

Court
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Writing for the Court
Hervey, J.; Price, J.; Womack, J.; Johnson, J.; Keasler, J.; Cochran, J.; Alcala, J.
Jurisdiction
Texas
Decision date
June 5, 2013
Docket number
AP-76,763 & AP-76,764
Procedural posture
Applicant sought post-conviction habeas relief under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.07 after pleading guilty pursuant to negotiated plea agreements. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief, set aside the judgments, and returned the parties to their pre-plea positions because the State breached the plea agreements by reindicting Applicant's brother.
Standard of review
The Court examined the written plea agreements and the formal record under general contract-law principles to determine the intended terms of the plea bargains.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Parties
Jesus De Leon, Applicant v. State of Texas
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

plea bargaininghabeas corpuspost-conviction reliefappellate procedurecriminal procedure

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurepost-conviction habeas corpusplea bargainingappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether, considering the plea documents and the entire record, waiver of appeal was a binding term of De Leon's plea agreements.
  2. Whether De Leon breached the plea agreements by seeking and obtaining permission to appeal.
  3. Whether the State breached the plea agreements by reindicting De Leon's brother after the trial court accepted the agreements.
  4. What remedy was appropriate when the State breached the plea agreements and specific performance was no longer possible.

Holdings

  1. Waiver of appeal was not a binding or essential element of De Leon's plea agreements because the plea documents were ambiguous and the plea-hearing record showed that appeal was permitted with the trial court's permission.
  2. De Leon did not breach the plea agreements by seeking permission to appeal and pursuing an appeal after the trial court granted permission.
  3. The State breached the plea agreements by reindicting De Leon's brother after agreeing to dismiss the indictment against him.
  4. Because specific performance was impossible after the brother had been convicted, the proper remedy was to set aside De Leon's judgments and return both parties to their original pre-plea positions.

Key quotations

In a plea bargain case, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial; or (B) after getting the trial court's permission to appeal.” (89)
Therefore, in light of all of the evidence in the record, a waiver of appeal was not an essential element of Applicant's plea agreements. (90)
Applicant did not breach the agreements when he obtained the court's permission to appeal and appealed. Consequently, the State breached the agreements when it reindicted Applicant's brother. (90)
Thus, the proper remedy is to return both parties to their original pre-plea positions. (91)

Factual background

Jesus De Leon pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child, sexual performance by a child, and twenty-two counts of possession of child pornography under agreements that included a punishment cap, concurrent sentences, and dismissal of the indictment against his brother. Although boilerplate language addressed appeal waivers, the plea hearing reflected that De Leon could appeal with the trial court's permission, and the State did not object to that explanation. After the trial court granted permission to appeal, the State reindicted De Leon's brother, who was later convicted, making specific performance of the dismissal term impossible.

Procedural history

Applicant pleaded guilty in two Cameron County cases pursuant to agreements under which the State capped punishment, agreed to concurrent sentences, and agreed to dismiss the indictment against his brother. After the trial court granted Applicant permission to appeal, the State sought enforcement of an alleged waiver of appeal and later reindicted Applicant's brother. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Court of Criminal Appeals refused discretionary review. Applicant then filed article 11.07 habeas applications. After remand for findings and supplemental proceedings, the habeas court recommended denial, but the Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief.

Remand instructions

The judgments in causes 06-CR-0405-G and 06-CR-2746-G were set aside. De Leon was remanded to the custody of the Cameron County Sheriff to answer the charges in the indictments, and the trial court was ordered to issue any necessary bench warrants within ten days after mandate issued.

Court Document

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