Summary
The Supreme Court of Texas held that Texas law governed the construction of a release executed in Texas and that the release did not discharge Cessna Aircraft Company because Cessna was not specifically identified. The court adopted comparative allocation of damages in products liability cases tried after July 13, 1983, allowing allocation among the plaintiff, defendants, and third parties according to their respective percentages of causation. The court nevertheless held that Cessna had not preserved its contribution claim against the pilot's estate and rendered judgment for Duncan on the jury's verdict.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Texas or New Mexico law governed the effect of Duncan's release on Cessna's liability.
- Whether the general release specifically identified Cessna so as to discharge Cessna's liability under Texas law.
- Whether a strictly liable products defendant may obtain comparative allocation of causation among the plaintiff, defendants, settling tortfeasors, and third parties.
- Whether Cessna preserved its contribution claim by maintaining live pleadings and preserving excluded negligence evidence through a bill of exceptions.
- Whether Cessna was entitled to a credit for Duncan's prior settlement.
Holdings
- Texas law governs the effect of Duncan's release because Texas has the most significant relationship to that substantive issue.
- A general reference to a class of tortfeasors does not discharge each member of the class; a release protects a tortfeasor only if it names the tortfeasor or describes it with sufficient particularity that its identity or connection to the event is not in doubt. Because the release did not specifically identify Cessna, it did not discharge Cessna's liability.
- In products-liability cases tried after July 13, 1983, the trier of fact may allocate the plaintiff's damages among the plaintiff, defendants, settling tortfeasors, and third parties according to each party's percentage of causation, even when at least one defendant is strictly liable.
- The comparative-causation system is pure: a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the percentage of causation attributed to the plaintiff, regardless of whether that percentage exceeds the defendants' combined percentage. Each defendant found to have caused the injuries remains jointly and severally liable for the recoverable amount, subject to contribution for payments exceeding that defendant's percentage share.
- When a non-negligence products-liability theory is established, a settlement with one tortfeasor reduces the plaintiff's recovery and the nonsettling defendants' liability by the percentage of causation allocated to the settling tortfeasor, rather than by a pro rata or dollar credit.
- Cessna was not entitled to a remand for comparative apportionment because, although its second amended answer contained live negligence allegations, it failed to preserve the excluded negligence evidence through a formal bill of exceptions.
- Although future cases governed by comparative causation would use a percentage credit, Cessna was entitled in this case to a credit for the $90,000 prior settlement because the settling parties' liability had not been established and the lower courts had applied the then-accepted dollar-credit approach.
Key quotations
“A tortfeasor can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to him by name or with such descriptive particularity that his identity or his connection with the tortious event is not in doubt.” (420)
“Accordingly, we hereby adopt such a system. Many courts and commentators have labeled this type of loss allocation comparative fault. We choose comparative causation instead because it is conceptually accurate in cases based on strict liability and breach of warranty theories in which the defendant's "fault," in the traditional sense of culpability, is not at issue.” (427)
“We therefore hold that in products liability cases in which at least one defendant is found liable on a theory other than negligence, the plaintiff's damages shall be reduced only by the percentage of causation attributed to the plaintiff, regardless of how large or small that percentage may be.” (429)
“Accordingly, to the extent it conflicts with this opinion, we overrule Bradshaw v. Baylor University.” (432)
Factual background
Benjamin Smithson, an instructor pilot for Air Plains West, was giving James Parker flying lessons when their Cessna 150 crashed in New Mexico in 1976, killing both men. Parker's widow, Carolyn Duncan, settled her claims against Air Plains West for $90,000 and executed a release referring to Air Plains West, Smithson's estate, and other responsible persons or corporations. Duncan later sued Cessna, alleging that defects in the cockpit-seat legs caused or enhanced Parker's fatal injuries. A jury awarded Duncan $1,000,000, but the trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Cessna.
Procedural history
Duncan first sued Air Plains West and Benjamin Smithson's estate in federal court and settled with Air Plains West for $90,000, executing a general release. She then sued Cessna for alleged design and manufacturing defects in the airplane seats. The trial court struck or sustained exceptions to Cessna's contribution and negligence pleadings, excluded proposed negligence evidence, and granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court of appeals ordered a partial new trial, but the Supreme Court rendered judgment for Duncan and held that Cessna failed to preserve its contribution claim.