Summary
The Texas Supreme Court held that the Craddock standard does not apply to a motion for new trial following summary judgment when the nonmovant had notice of the hearing and an opportunity to seek a continuance or leave to file a late response. The Court established that leave to file a late summary-judgment response requires good cause, consisting of an accidental or mistaken failure to respond and an absence of undue delay or injury to the movant. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for consideration of an unresolved issue concerning summary judgment against Cimarron’s individual-capacity claim.
Holdings
- Craddock does not apply to a motion for new trial filed after summary judgment is granted when the nonmovant had notice of the hearing and an opportunity before judgment to seek a continuance or obtain leave to file a late response under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
- A motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response should be granted when the nonmovant establishes good cause by showing that the failure to respond timely was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but resulted from accident or mistake, and that allowing the late response will cause no undue delay or otherwise injure the summary-judgment movant.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cimarron leave to file a late response or in denying its motion for new trial because Cimarron's motion did not explain the failure to respond and offered no supporting evidence establishing accident or mistake.
Questions Presented
- Whether the equitable Craddock standard for setting aside default judgments applies to a motion for new trial filed after summary judgment was granted when the nonmovant knew of its failure to respond before the summary-judgment hearing and could seek a continuance or leave to file a late response.
- What standard governs a motion for leave to file a late response to a summary-judgment motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Cimarron's motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response and motion for new trial.
- Whether the court of appeals should consider Cimarron's unresolved contention that summary judgment was improper as to Carpenter individually.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (13)
- Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939)(applied as a contrast; not applicable here)
- Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1966)(distinguished)
- Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 979 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Medina v. W. Waste Indus., 959 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Washington v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Gonzales v. Surplus Ins. Servs., 863 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, writ denied)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Krchnak v. Fulton, 759 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, writ denied)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Costello v. Johnson, 680 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(disapproved to the extent inconsistent)
- Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1996)(followed)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Deggs, 968 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1998)(followed)
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