Summary
The Supreme Court of Texas interpreted the Good Samaritan statute's exception for emergency care provided "for or in expectation of remuneration." The court held that a person seeking the statute's protection must establish that, under the circumstances, they would not ordinarily receive or ordinarily be entitled to receive payment. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for consideration of an unresolved statutory exception.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- What must a person prove to establish that emergency care was not administered "for or in expectation of remuneration" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.001(b)(1) and (d)?
- Whether Dr. McIntyre conclusively established that he would not ordinarily receive or ordinarily be entitled to receive payment for the emergency care provided to Ramirez.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by striking Dr. Edelberg's expert affidavit as conclusory and insufficient to raise a fact issue.
Holdings
- To establish that emergency care was not provided "for or in expectation of remuneration" under section 74.001(b)(1) and (d), the person seeking the Good Samaritan defense must prove that, under the circumstances in which the emergency care was provided, the person would neither ordinarily receive nor ordinarily be entitled to receive payment.
- Dr. McIntyre conclusively established that he did not act for or in expectation of remuneration because his uncontroverted testimony showed that he would neither ordinarily charge nor ordinarily be entitled to charge for emergency services provided under the circumstances.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking Dr. Edelberg's affidavit because his assertion that McIntyre was entitled to bill and receive a fee was a conclusory legal conclusion unsupported by facts or rationale and therefore did not raise a genuine fact issue.
Key quotations
“On this issue of first impression, we hold that the statute requires a person to prove that he or she would not ordinarily receive or ordinarily be entitled to receive payment under the circumstances in which the emergency care was provided.” (742-743)
“Thus, reading subsection (d) to require that the person seeking protection of the statute prove that he would neither ordinarily receive nor ordinarily be entitled to receive remuneration comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of subsection (d) and ensures that this section is consistent with subsection (b)(1).” (746)
Factual background
Ramirez was admitted to St. David's Medical Center for an induced labor under the care of Dr. Patricia Gunter, who left the labor and delivery area as labor progressed. Dr. McIntyre, who was not on call for Gunter and had no prior relationship with Ramirez, responded to an emergency "Dr. Stork" page and delivered the infant during a shoulder-dystocia emergency. The infant sustained permanent neurological impairment and paralysis of the right upper extremity and shoulder girdle. McIntyre testified that he neither charged nor expected compensation and that physicians ordinarily did not charge under those circumstances.
Procedural history
Ramirez sued Dr. McIntyre, Dr. Gunter, and St. David's Medical Center for medical negligence arising from injuries sustained during an emergency delivery. The trial court granted McIntyre's summary-judgment motion based on the Good Samaritan statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding that McIntyre had not conclusively established that he was not legally entitled to receive payment for the emergency services. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals and remanded for consideration of an unresolved issue.
Remand instructions
The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including consideration of the unresolved issue under section 74.001(c)(1).