Forest Oil Corporation and Daniel B. Worden v. James Argyle McAllen, El Rucio Land and Cattle Company, Inc., San Juanito Land Partnership, and McAllen Trust Partnership

Summary

In this dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson argues that a settlement agreement's general disclaimer of reliance should not bar James Argyle McAllen's fraudulent inducement claim. The dissent distinguishes Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson, asserting that the disclaimer neither expressly waived fraudulent inducement claims nor disclaimed reliance on representations concerning the specific environmental issues in dispute. It also concludes that McAllen's reliance on representations about surface contamination was not unjustifiable as a matter of law.

Holdings

1. Under Schlumberger, a disclaimer bars a fraudulent-inducement claim only when it clearly expresses the parties' intent to waive fraudulent-inducement claims or disclaims reliance on representations about the specific matter in dispute. The disclaimer in this case did neither, so McAllen's fraudulent-inducement claim should survive.
2. McAllen's reliance was not unjustifiable as a matter of law because the evidence indicated that representations were made not only by an unidentified attorney but also by Forest Oil's parties or owners themselves.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a general disclaimer of reliance in a settlement agreement bars a fraudulent-inducement claim when the agreement does not expressly waive fraudulent-inducement claims or disclaim reliance on representations concerning the specific matter in dispute.
2. Whether McAllen's reliance on representations made by Forest Oil, its owners, and its attorneys during adversarial settlement negotiations was unjustifiable as a matter of law.

Disposition

other