Felton v. Lovett

388 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2012) · Supreme Court of Texas · November 30, 2012

Summary

The Texas Supreme Court held that a chiropractor has a common-law duty to disclose risks inherent in chiropractic treatment, even when the statutory informed-consent provision of the Texas Medical Liability Act does not apply. The court concluded that vertebral artery dissection and stroke were inherent risks of chiropractic neck manipulation because they were directly related to the treatment and could occur without negligence. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.

Holdings

  1. Section 74.101 of the Medical Liability Act does not govern a failure-to-disclose claim involving chiropractic treatment because a chiropractor is a health care provider but not a physician, and chiropractic manipulation is not medical care or a surgical procedure as those terms are used in the statute. When section 74.101 does not apply, the common law governs.
  2. A reasonable chiropractor must disclose treatment risks that would influence a reasonable patient in deciding whether to undergo treatment, while not being required to disclose risks that would be unduly disturbing to an unreasonable patient.
  3. The possibility that a patient will suffer vertebral artery dissection and stroke from chiropractic neck manipulation, even because of an undetectable physical condition, is an inherent risk of the treatment and must be disclosed.
  4. The jury's failure to find that negligent treatment proximately caused Felton's injury did not preclude liability for negligent nondisclosure and did not create an irreconcilable conflict with the jury's nondisclosure findings.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether vertebral artery dissection and stroke resulting from chiropractic neck manipulation are risks inherent in the treatment and therefore subject to disclosure under the common-law informed-consent duty.
  2. Whether Texas Medical Liability Act section 74.101 governed Felton's claim even though a chiropractor is a health care provider but not a physician and the treatment was not medical care or surgery.
  3. Whether the jury's failure to find negligent treatment that proximately caused Felton's injury precluded liability for negligent nondisclosure or conflicted with the jury's nondisclosure findings.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (17)

  • Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2010)(applied)
  • Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 450 (Tex. 2004)(applied)
  • Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999)(applied)
  • Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1967)(followed)
  • Nicodeme v. Bailey, 243 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(cited)
  • Hartfiel v. Owen, 618 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(followed)
  • Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929, 930-931 (Tex. 1983)(followed)
  • Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of America, 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994)(cited)
  • Barclay v. Campbell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 9-10 (Tex. 1986)(followed)
  • Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 654-655 (Tex. 2004)(followed)

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