Summary
Justice Lehrmann, joined by Justice Devine, concurs in the judgment reversing the termination of John’s parental rights. The concurrence agrees that John lacked proper notice of trial but concludes that he waived that error by attending without objection. It further reasons that Texas law required the trial court to admonish an indigent parent of the statutory right to appointed counsel and that John was not given a meaningful opportunity to invoke or waive that right.
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that K.M.L.'s mother knowingly and voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.
- Whether the court of appeals' judgment terminating John's parental rights should be reversed because John did not receive notice of trial in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245.
- Whether John waived any complaint about inadequate trial notice by attending trial without objecting or requesting a continuance.
- Whether the trial court was required to admonish an indigent parent of the statutory right to appointed counsel in a state-initiated parental-rights termination proceeding.
Holdings
- The evidence was legally insufficient to establish that K.M.L.'s mother knowingly and voluntarily relinquished her parental rights.
- Justice Lehrmann would hold that John waived the lack-of-notice complaint by attending trial without objecting to the lack of notice or requesting a continuance.
- Justice Lehrmann would hold that, even before the statutory amendment expressly added the requirement, the Texas Family Code required trial courts to admonish parents in state-initiated termination proceedings of their right to appointed counsel and that the right was contingent on a finding of indigence.
Factual background
K.M.L.'s parental rights were terminated in a state-initiated proceeding. John attended the trial but did not object to the lack of proper notice or request a continuance, and he did not request appointed counsel or file the required affidavit of indigence. The trial court did not admonish John that an indigent parent had a statutory right to appointed counsel, although the judge later acknowledged at trial that John would have been entitled to appointed counsel had he established indigence earlier.
Procedural history
The trial court entered a judgment terminating the parental rights of K.M.L.'s mother and father, John. The court of appeals affirmed the termination judgment. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment. Justice Lehrmann concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the mother's relinquishment was legally insufficient and that John's termination judgment should be reversed, but disagreeing with the Court's reasoning concerning waiver of inadequate trial notice and arguing that the trial court also erred by failing to admonish John about his statutory right to appointed counsel.