Summary
The Texas Supreme Court interpreted the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) and held that its requirement of clear and specific evidence does not exclude relevant circumstantial evidence or impose a heightened burden of proof. The Court concluded that conclusory evidence of business-disparagement damages was insufficient to establish a prima facie case, while addressing defamation and related claims arising from statements about alleged groundwater contamination and oil-and-gas operations.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Texas Citizens Participation Act's requirement that a claimant establish a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence permits consideration of relevant circumstantial evidence and rational inferences.
- Whether Range presented sufficient evidence under the TCPA to maintain its business-disparagement claim against Steven Lipsky.
- Whether Range's defamation claim against Steven Lipsky was actionable per se and therefore did not require proof of special damages at the TCPA stage.
- Whether the TCPA required dismissal of Range's claims against Shyla Lipsky and Alisa Rich and its civil-conspiracy claim.
Holdings
- Relevant circumstantial evidence and rational inferences may be considered when determining whether a claimant has established a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 27.005(c).
- The TCPA does not impose an elevated evidentiary standard and does not categorically reject circumstantial evidence; cases interpreting the Act to require direct evidence of each essential element are disapproved.
- Range did not present clear and specific evidence establishing prima facie special damages for business disparagement because its affidavit asserting economic losses and lost profits was conclusory and unsupported by specific facts.
- Range's allegations that Lipsky falsely portrayed it as a polluter and threat to public health and safety were potentially defamatory per se because they adversely affected Range's fitness and abilities as a natural-gas producer; proof of special damages was therefore unnecessary to defeat the TCPA motion.
- The TCPA required dismissal of Range's claims against Shyla Lipsky and Alisa Rich and of Range's civil-conspiracy claim because Range presented no clear and specific evidence that either woman published defamatory statements or that the defendants agreed to conspire to blame Range publicly.
Key quotations
“In short, it does not impose a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial.” (at 591)
“Instead, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim.” (at 591)
“We agree that no clear and specific evidence establishes a prima facie case that Shyla Lipsky or Alisa Rich published any defamatory remarks concerning Range or conspired with Steven Lipsky “to publicly blame Range for the contamination.”” (at 597)
Factual background
Steven and Shyla Lipsky's water well developed mechanical problems and tested positive for methane and other gases after Range Resources and Range Production drilled nearby gas wells. Lipsky publicized his belief that Range's hydraulic-fracturing operations contaminated the well, while the Texas Railroad Commission concluded after an evidentiary investigation that Range's wells were not the source of the contamination. Range sued the Lipskys' environmental consultant, Alisa Rich, and the Lipskys for defamation, business disparagement, and civil conspiracy, prompting TCPA motions to dismiss.
Procedural history
The trial court dismissed the Lipskys' claims against Range as an improper collateral attack on a Railroad Commission determination but denied TCPA motions to dismiss Range's counterclaims and third-party claims. The court of appeals dismissed the attempted interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction, treated the matter as an original proceeding, granted mandamus relief to Shyla Lipsky and Alisa Rich, denied relief to Steven Lipsky in part, and denied Range relief. The Supreme Court of Texas generally agreed with the court of appeals and denied both petitions for mandamus relief.