Summary
The Texas Supreme Court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) permits a trial court to apply the sham affidavit rule when a later sworn statement materially conflicts with prior sworn testimony without sufficient explanation. Applying that rule, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision to disregard Lujan’s affidavit, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Texas trial courts may apply the sham affidavit rule under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) to disregard sworn testimony that materially conflicts with prior sworn testimony without a sufficient explanation.
- Whether the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding Lujan's affidavit as a sham.
- Whether the court of appeals' partial summary judgment ruling resolved all of Lujan's claims, including claims for damages arising before June 12, 2006.
Holdings
- A Texas trial court may conclude that a party has not raised a genuine fact issue when the party submits sworn testimony that materially conflicts with the same witness's prior sworn testimony, unless the party provides a sufficient explanation for the conflict.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion by disregarding Lujan's affidavit as a sham and granting partial summary judgment against him.
- The case must be remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether any claims, including claims for damages arising before June 12, 2006, remain unresolved.
Key quotations
“Under Rule 166a(c), a trial court may conclude that a party does not raise a genuine fact issue by submitting sworn testimony that materially conflicts with the same witness's prior sworn testimony, unless there is a sufficient explanation for the conflict.” (87)
“The sham affidavit rule is not a free-standing rule of procedure to be mechanically applied in the same way to every case.” (87)
“The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the court of appeals.” (92)
Factual background
Albert Lujan purchased five CF600 trucks manufactured by Navistar for his flower-delivery business. In 2006, he incorporated the business and transferred assets, including the trucks, to Texas Wholesale Flower Co., Inc., although he later testified inconsistently about whether ownership had transferred. Lujan subsequently sued Navistar individually for truck-related losses and submitted an affidavit denying that the corporation had conducted business or possessed assets or liabilities, contradicting his deposition testimony, corporate tax returns, and section 351 transfer documents.
Procedural history
Lujan sued Navistar for breach of express and implied warranties concerning defective trucks. After Texas Wholesale Flower Co., Inc. intervened as a plaintiff, the trial court struck the intervention as untimely. The trial court later struck Lujan's affidavit as a sham and granted partial summary judgment against him, while also granting summary judgment on the merits of his claims. The court of appeals affirmed the partial summary judgment, adopted the sham affidavit doctrine, and did not reach the merits-based summary judgment. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the partial summary judgment, reversed in part because the record did not establish whether claims arising before June 12, 2006 remained unresolved, and remanded to the court of appeals.
Remand instructions
The court of appeals must determine whether any of Lujan's claims remain unresolved, including claims for damages arising before June 12, 2006. The court of appeals must also address the merits-based summary judgment if appropriate.