Summary
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a habeas applicant alleging ineffective assistance during plea bargaining must satisfy the prejudice standard established by Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. The applicant must show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, and the trial court would not have rejected it; the case was remanded for further findings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- What prejudice standard governs an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim alleging that deficient advice caused a defendant to reject a plea bargain?
- Whether Ex parte Lemke's less demanding prejudice standard remained valid after Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper.
- Whether claims relying on Article I, Sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution are cognizable in a postconviction habeas proceeding under Article 11.07.
Holdings
- To establish prejudice when a defendant was not informed of a plea offer or rejected an offer because of deficient legal advice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that the applicant would have accepted the offer with effective assistance, that the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, and that the trial court would not have refused to accept it.
- Ex parte Lemke is overruled to the extent that its federal constitutional prejudice standard is inconsistent with Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper.
- Claims dependent on Article I, Sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution are not cognizable in a postconviction writ of habeas corpus brought under Article 11.07 when the alleged error is subject to a harm analysis.
Key quotations
“We hold that to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in which a defendant is not made aware of a plea-bargain offer, or rejects a plea-bargain because of bad legal advice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that: (1) he would have accepted the earlier offer if counsel had not given ineffective assistance; (2) the prosecution would not have withdrawn the offer; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept the plea bargain.” (784)
“Thus, to the extent that Lemke is inconsistent with Frye and Lafler, we have no choice but to overrule it.” (784)
Factual background
Applicant rejected an eight-year imprisonment plea offer and later pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact. The trial judge assessed concurrent twenty-year sentences. Counsel incorrectly advised Applicant that he was eligible for judge-ordered community supervision and shock probation, although the governing statutes permitted shock probation only following a jury recommendation of probation and permitted the judge to order deferred adjudication. Applicant asserted that, had he received correct advice, he would have accepted the State's offer.
Procedural history
After rejecting the State's eight-year plea offer, Applicant pleaded guilty in open court to aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact and received concurrent twenty-year sentences. He filed two applications for writs of habeas corpus alleging that counsel incorrectly advised him about eligibility for judge-ordered community supervision and shock probation. The convicting court found deficient advice, and the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded for findings applying the prejudice standard announced in this opinion.
Remand instructions
The habeas court was instructed to make findings consistent with the opinion, including whether there was a reasonable probability that Applicant would have accepted the earlier offer, that the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, and that the trial court would not have refused to accept it.