Ray Escandon v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Cincinnati Insurance Company’s motion for partial summary judgment in an uninsured motorist coverage dispute. The court held that A.R.S. § 23-1023 does not bar the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim and that Arizona law permits potential double recovery of workers’ compensation-covered medical expenses where the policy lacks an applicable offset provision. The court also denied the defendant’s request for attorney fees.

Holdings

1. A.R.S. § 23-1023 does not bar Escandon's uninsured-motorist claim because the statutory references to an action against an "other person" or "another person" refer to a third-party tortfeasor, not an uninsured-motorist insurer.
2. Arizona law does not independently bar a potential double recovery where the plaintiff seeks recovery under uninsured-motorist coverage and workers' compensation coverage, absent an applicable contractual offset provision.
3. The uninsured-motorist policy provisions identified by Cincinnati did not, as a matter of law, require offsetting Escandon's uninsured-motorist coverage by the workers' compensation payments.
4. Cincinnati was not entitled to attorney fees on the present motion. Its request under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 was denied without prejudice as premature, and its request under A.R.S. § 12-349(A) was denied on the merits.

Questions Presented

1. Whether A.R.S. § 23-1023 bars an injured employee from asserting an uninsured-motorist claim for medical expenses associated with a previously accepted workers' compensation injury.
2. Whether Arizona's rule against double recovery bars recovery under uninsured-motorist coverage for medical expenses previously paid by a workers' compensation insurer.
3. Whether the Cincinnati uninsured-motorist policy contains an applicable offset or exclusion provision requiring reduction of Escandon's uninsured-motorist recovery by the workers' compensation payments.
4. Whether the limited record established as a matter of law that the claimed medical expenses resulted from the prior industrial injury rather than the later motor-vehicle accident.
5. Whether Cincinnati was entitled to attorney fees under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 or 12-349(A).

Disposition

other