Bathsheba Nichole Adams v. Kiewit Infrastructure West Company, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona rules on Kiewit Infrastructure West Company’s motion to dismiss Bathsheba Nichole Adams’s First Amended Complaint. The court declines to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery claims under the Arizona Employment Protection Act, Arizona Civil Rights Act, exhaustion principles, or workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions, but dismisses the negligent supervision and training claim without prejudice. The court also denies as moot a motion to strike a response concerning a request for judicial notice.

Holdings

1. The Arizona Employment Protection Act and Arizona Civil Rights Act did not preclude Adams's intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, or negligent supervision claims because those claims were based on alleged tortious conduct and did not require proof of discrimination based on a protected status.
2. Adams's alleged failure to timely exhaust administrative remedies under the Arizona Civil Rights Act or Title VII did not bar her common-law tort claims because she did not assert an ACRA or Title VII claim and the cited exhaustion authorities concerned statutory discrimination or AEPA retaliation claims.
3. The Workers' Compensation Act did not bar Adams's intentional infliction of emotional distress or assault and battery claims at the pleading stage because the alleged intentional conduct plausibly invoked the willful-misconduct exception to the exclusive-remedy provisions.
4. The negligent supervision and training claim was barred by the workers' compensation exclusive-remedy provisions because Adams alleged only Kiewit's negligent failure to exercise ordinary care and did not allege willful misconduct by Kiewit itself.
5. Adams adequately pleaded Kiewit's vicarious liability for Young's conduct because she alleged that Young was Kiewit's foreman, acted during work hours and at the worksite, and engaged in conduct incidental to his duties or partly intended to serve Kiewit's business.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Adams's intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and negligent supervision and training claims were precluded by the Arizona Employment Protection Act or Arizona Civil Rights Act.
2. Whether Adams's failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred her common-law tort claims.
3. Whether Arizona's workers' compensation exclusive-remedy provisions barred the intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, and negligent supervision claims.
4. Whether Adams adequately pleaded Kiewit's vicarious liability for Young's conduct.
5. Whether Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's response to the request for judicial notice should be granted.

Disposition

other