Martinez-Andino v. Mullin

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia addresses an immigration detainee's claims arising from his removal to Honduras, including alleged denial of access to counsel and due process. The court grants the defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part, allowing Fifth Amendment and detention-standards claims to proceed. The court also grants in part the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and orders the government to facilitate his return to the United States.

Holdings

1. The APA claim was moot because § 706(1) authorizes an order compelling agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, and the only challenged actions—disclosing plaintiff's location and permitting access to counsel—had already occurred.
2. Those claims were not moot because plaintiff sought forward-looking relief, including facilitation of his return to the United States and restoration of the procedural position he would have occupied absent the alleged violations.
3. Plaintiff had standing because his alleged injury was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision granting at least some of the requested relief, including facilitation of his return.
4. Plaintiff failed to state an Accardi claim based on 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) because that provision concerns specified examinations, including inspections at ports of entry and naturalization examinations, and plaintiff identified no applicable examination involving his voluntary-departure forms.
5. Plaintiff adequately stated an Accardi claim based on the PBNDS by alleging that the standards were binding, were promulgated to protect detainees' procedural rights, and were violated when officials denied him access to counsel and failed to notify counsel during transfers and removal.
6. Plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claim that defendants violated his Fifth Amendment due-process rights by denying him access to counsel before removal and relying on a purported voluntary-departure waiver that plaintiff plausibly alleged was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.
7. A court may order the government to facilitate a removed noncitizen's return to the United States when the plaintiff shows a likelihood that the removal was unlawful and return is necessary to restore the process that should have occurred.
8. Plaintiff was not entitled to a TRO ordering DHS to parole him into the United States because parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 is discretionary and plaintiff had not shown that detention itself was unlawful.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche was properly named as a defendant.
2. Whether plaintiff's Mandamus Act, Fifth Amendment, and Accardi claims were moot after plaintiff was removed and later obtained access to counsel and information about his location.
3. Whether plaintiff's APA claim under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) was moot after the government disclosed his location and provided access to counsel.
4. Whether plaintiff had standing because his alleged injuries were redressable through an order facilitating his return to the United States.
5. Whether 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) applied to plaintiff's signing of voluntary-departure documents.
6. Whether ICE's Performance-Based National Detention Standards could support an Accardi claim and whether plaintiff adequately alleged final agency action.
7. Whether plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Fifth Amendment due-process claim and was entitled to a TRO directing defendants to facilitate his return.
8. Whether the court could order defendants to parole plaintiff into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.

Disposition

other