Mark Roote v. Kershaw County, Kershaw County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Lee Boan, and Danny Templar

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims arising from his removal and arrest at a Kershaw County Council meeting. The court rejects claims alleging excessive force, First Amendment retaliation, viewpoint discrimination, and municipal liability under Monell. The court dismisses the constitutional claims with prejudice and remands the remaining state-law claims to the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas.

Holdings

1. Sheriff Boan's use of force was objectively reasonable and not excessive because Roote refused multiple directives, disrupted the meeting, and physically resisted removal, while the force used was minimal and reasonably necessary to overcome that resistance.
2. Roote's First Amendment retaliation claim failed because he did not show that his protected speech was the but-for cause of his arrest and removal.
3. Roote failed to establish viewpoint discrimination because he presented no evidence that the council's speaking-time restrictions were applied selectively based on viewpoint.
4. Kershaw County was entitled to summary judgment because Roote identified no express unconstitutional policy, final policymaker decision supported by evidence, failure-to-train theory, or persistent and widespread unconstitutional practice.
5. After dismissing the federal claims at an early stage, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and remanded them to the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Sheriff Boan used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when removing and arresting Roote.
2. Whether Boan and Templar retaliated against Roote in violation of the First Amendment because of his critical speech.
3. Whether Boan and Templar engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by enforcing the county council's speaking-time restrictions against Roote.
4. Whether Kershaw County could be held liable under Monell for an unconstitutional policy, decision, failure to train, or widespread practice concerning speech-time limits and speaker removal.
5. Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.

Disposition

other