Biosoft (Australia) Pty Ltd. v. Exotropin, LLC and Does 1-5

Summary

The United States District Court for the District of Utah grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action concerning the EXO SKIN trademark. The court concludes that the plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant and also declines to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act because a related trademark action was pending in the Southern District of Florida. The court therefore dismisses the claims without addressing venue or transfer.

Holdings

1. The post-complaint assignment did not establish that the declaratory judgment action was moot because the evidence, viewed in Biosoft's favor, permitted the inference that Biosoft retained a concrete commercial interest in EXO SKIN products.
2. The court lacked general personal jurisdiction over Exotropin because Exotropin was incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, and its limited Utah contacts did not constitute an exceptional case rendering it at home in Utah.
3. Biosoft failed to establish specific personal jurisdiction because Exotropin did not purposefully direct the relevant conduct at Utah and the declaratory claims did not arise out of or relate to Exotropin's Utah commercial activity.
4. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action because it was an anticipatory and duplicative filing, the Florida action offered a faster and more complete remedy, and the relevant Declaratory Judgment Act factors overwhelmingly disfavored proceeding in Utah.
5. The claims against the Doe defendants were dismissed under the Declaratory Judgment Act and, alternatively, without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) because the complaint provided no specific facts concerning them and it was patently obvious that Biosoft could not prevail on the allegations.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Biosoft's post-filing assignment of the EXO SKIN mark rendered the declaratory judgment action moot.
2. Whether the District of Utah had general or specific personal jurisdiction over Exotropin.
3. Whether the court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act when a related trademark action was pending in the Southern District of Florida and the Utah action appeared anticipatory.
4. Whether the claims against the unidentified Doe defendants should be dismissed under the Declaratory Judgment Act or, alternatively, under Rule 12(b)(6).
5. Whether venue should be addressed or the case transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Disposition

dismissed