Darrell Robertson v. Dennis Lanni, et al.

Summary

The court denies Defendants J. Phillip Jones and Jessica Binkley’s motion to dismiss the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim asserted against them in Darrell Robertson’s Second Amended Complaint. The opinion addresses whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-116(f) provides a defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage and whether the complaint plausibly alleges that the defendants qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA. The action concerns attempted collection and threatened nonjudicial foreclosure involving residential real property in Nashville, Tennessee.

Holdings

1. Section 35-5-116(f) did not warrant dismissal because the Second Amended Complaint did not affirmatively trigger the statute's potential good-faith-reliance defense, and a plaintiff generally need not anticipate or negate an affirmative defense in the complaint.
2. The Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that the Trustees were debt collectors under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) because they allegedly used the mails or the internet in a business whose principal purpose was enforcement of security interests through nonjudicial foreclosure.
3. The court declined to decide whether the FDCPA preempts Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-5-116(f) because the preemption issue was unnecessary to resolve the motion to dismiss.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-5-116(f) required dismissal of Robertson's FDCPA claim against the Trustees based on an asserted good-faith-reliance protection.
2. Whether Robertson plausibly alleged that the Trustees were debt collectors under the FDCPA's provision applicable to persons whose business principally concerns enforcement of security interests.
3. Whether the court needed to decide whether the FDCPA preempted Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-5-116(f).

Disposition

other