Summary
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois dismisses Jacqueline Brown’s pro se § 1983 complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court concludes that the complaint lacks specific allegations of personal involvement, asserts claims against an immune prosecutor and an improper § 1983 defendant, and fails to plausibly allege constitutional or statutory violations arising from recorded controlled buys and an investigation involving Brown’s son. The court denies in forma pauperis status but grants Brown 14 days to file an amended complaint.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the complaint stated a plausible § 1983 claim against the named defendants when it alleged only generic and conclusory conduct by most defendants.
- Whether the prosecutor was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages under § 1983.
- Whether the federal FBI defendant could be sued under § 1983 or instead would have to be pursued under Bivens, and whether the complaint alleged his personal involvement.
- Whether the allegations concerning an informant's recording of controlled buys inside Brown's residence stated a plausible Fourth Amendment, Illinois eavesdropping, or federal wiretap claim.
- Whether Brown could maintain a fabrication-of-evidence claim based on evidence allegedly used against her son rather than against Brown herself, and whether some claims were time-barred.
Holdings
- A § 1983 complaint must identify specific acts or omissions by each defendant showing personal involvement in a constitutional violation and must plead sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim. Brown's generic and conclusory allegations against most defendants failed this requirement.
- A prosecutor is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from damages under § 1983 for the alleged approval of investigative recording devices in the circumstances alleged.
- A federal FBI agent acting under color of federal law is not a proper defendant under § 1983; a constitutional claim against such an officer would have to proceed, if at all, under Bivens. Brown nevertheless failed to allege the agent's personal involvement.
- The complaint failed to state plausible Fourth Amendment, Illinois eavesdropping, or federal wiretap claims based on recordings made by an informant during controlled buys because it did not allege that the informant entered unlawfully or without consent, and a violation of state law alone does not establish a federal constitutional violation.
- The Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment do not provide Brown a cause of action based on allegedly fabricated evidence used only against her son rather than to obtain Brown's wrongful conviction or pretrial detention.
- The claims based on incidents occurring on July 11, 2023, and October 26, 2023, appeared to be barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 and Illinois personal-injury claims.
Key quotations
“A complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief.”
“In typical controlled-buy scenarios, an informant who is invited inside has lawful access to the areas where the transactions occur, and the use of a recording device does not transform the encounter into an unconstitutional search because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what is voluntarily disclosed to the informant.”
“The Due Process Clause and Fourth Amendment protect against the use of fabricated evidence to obtain a wrongful conviction or pretrial detention of the plaintiff herself; they do not provide a cause of action when the allegedly false evidence was used only against her son.”
Factual background
Brown alleged that a Jefferson County prosecutor approved recording devices worn by an informant into her residence during controlled buys involving Brown's son on July 11, 2023, October 26, 2023, and February 28, 2024. She claimed that occupants were recorded without permission and that law-enforcement officials later fabricated evidence to facilitate an allegedly warrantless search of her home on March 5, 2025. Brown asserted claims under § 1983, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Illinois eavesdropping statute, and federal wiretap statutes.
Procedural history
Brown filed a complaint alleging constitutional, federal statutory, and Illinois eavesdropping violations arising from law-enforcement investigations of her son. The court reviewed the complaint under the mandatory screening provisions applicable to IFP actions. It dismissed the complaint without prejudice, granted fourteen days to file an amended complaint, and denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis subject to sua sponte reconsideration if a meritorious amended complaint is filed.