Donna S. Smith v. Michael J. DeVito

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York grants Michael J. DeVito’s motion to dismiss Donna S. Smith’s claims arising from her termination as a provisional court reporter. The court dismisses the claims without prejudice, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain and suffering, and potentially Title VII, while granting Smith 30 days to amend.

Holdings

1. The complaint failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim because it did not identify the constitutional or federal right allegedly violated or explain how DeVito violated that right. The claim was dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
2. The allegations did not state an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim under § 1983 or New York law. The claim was dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
3. The third cause of action, characterized as pain and suffering from relocating between California and New York, was not an independent claim and was dismissed without prejudice.
4. To the extent the complaint intended to assert negligence in the wherefore clause, it failed to plausibly allege the elements of negligence. Any negligent supervision, hiring, training, or retention claim would also require allegations concerning the employee's known or reasonably discoverable propensity and conduct outside the scope of employment.
5. Because the complaint's claims were being dismissed and DeVito had not expressly addressed Title VII, plaintiff was permitted to reassert a Title VII claim in an amended complaint, but she was required to plead the basis for race discrimination and facts showing administrative exhaustion and compliance with the ninety-day filing requirement.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether the allegations stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under federal or New York law.
3. Whether the asserted pain-and-suffering claim stated an independent cause of action.
4. Whether the allegations stated a negligence or negligent supervision, hiring, training, or retention claim.
5. Whether plaintiff should be permitted to reassert a Title VII race-discrimination claim and plead administrative exhaustion and timeliness.

Disposition

other