Jahquill Johnson v. Laurel Harry, et al.

Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-194 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026) · United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · March 5, 2026 · No. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-194

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania addresses several pending motions in Jahquill Johnson’s pro se civil-rights action concerning alleged prison conditions, retaliation, access to courts, legal mail, and attorney communications. The court denies a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, grants Johnson a limited extension to respond to other motions, denies his motion to strike and declaration for entry of default, and grants public defender Ryan Dobo’s motion to dismiss. Johnson’s claims against Dobo are dismissed, with 30 days granted to amend those allegations.

Court
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Writing for the Court
D. Brooks Smith
Jurisdiction
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Decision date
March 5, 2026
Docket number
Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-194
Procedural posture
A pro se prisoner brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985-1986, the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state law. The court ruled on several pending procedural motions and granted public defender Ryan Dobo's motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against Dobo without prejudice and allowing amendment.
Standard of review
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court separates factual and legal elements, accepts well-pleaded nonconclusory factual allegations as true, construes a pro se prisoner's pleadings liberally, and determines whether the complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. A Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute requires consideration of the six Poulis factors. An extension after expiration of a deadline requires excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(1).
Precedential value
unpublished district court memorandum and order; nonprecedential
Parties
Jahquill Johnson v. Laurel Harry, Ryan Dobo, Lucas Malishchak, Scott Klenfelter, David Close, Rebecca Reifer, Sean Bresnahan, P.S.S. Olbert, P.S.S. Fresko, C.O. Buskirk, C.O. Morrison, C.O. Gallaher, Dr. Bloom
Disposition
other

Topics

motions to dismisscivil proceduresection 1983prisoners rightsdefault judgment

Practice areas

civil rightsprisoner litigationcivil procedureconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Bloom's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute should be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
  2. Whether Johnson established excusable neglect warranting an extension of time to oppose the pending motions to dismiss.
  3. Whether Johnson's motion to strike Dobo's reply brief should be granted under Rule 12(f).
  4. Whether Johnson's declaration for entry of default against Bloom should be granted.
  5. Whether Johnson plausibly stated claims against public defender Dobo under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel principles, the ADA, or state law.
  6. Whether Johnson's constitutional and ineffective-assistance claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Holdings

  1. Bloom's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was denied because the Poulis factors did not justify the drastic sanction of dismissal.
  2. Johnson was entitled to an extension of time, but only thirty days rather than the requested ninety days.
  3. Johnson's motion to strike Dobo's reply brief was denied.
  4. Johnson's declaration for entry of default against Bloom was denied because Bloom timely responded under the deadline applicable after waiver of service.
  5. A public defender generally does not act under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel to a criminal defendant, absent an applicable exception such as administrative or investigative conduct or a conspiracy with a state actor.
  6. Johnson failed to state conspiracy claims because he did not allege a combination, agreement, or understanding among the defendants to carry out a deprivation of his rights.
  7. Johnson's access-to-courts claim, Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claim, and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim were barred without prejudice by Heck because success would necessarily imply the invalidity of his still-standing criminal conviction.
  8. Johnson failed to allege Dobo's personal involvement in a violation of Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
  9. Any ADA and state-law claims against Dobo were dismissed for failure to state a claim because Johnson alleged no facts concerning Dobo supporting those causes of action.

Key quotations

dismissals with prejudice, or defaults, are drastic sanctions. (Section III.a)
A motion to dismiss “tests the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint.” (Section VI.a)
To successfully allege a conspiracy, a plaintiff must set forth “allegations of a combination, agreement, or understanding among all or between any of the defendants” to “carry out the alleged chain of events.” (Section VI.b.i)
Heck prohibits civil suits for damages that necessarily imply the invalidity of a standing criminal conviction. (Section VI.b.i)

Factual background

Johnson, an inmate at SCI-Houtzdale, alleged that corrections officers placed razor blades in his food, retaliated against him after he filed a grievance, interfered with his legal mail, and subjected him to harsh restrictive-housing conditions. Public defender Ryan Dobo visited Johnson at his cell while a corrections officer allegedly stood within earshot, and Dobo and a corrections officer allegedly refused Johnson transportation to a scheduled criminal court hearing. Johnson claimed that the refusal forced him to plead guilty in the underlying assault prosecution.

Procedural history

Johnson filed his complaint on August 28, 2024, naming thirteen defendants. Defendants filed three motions to dismiss. The court denied Bloom's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, granted in part Johnson's renewed motion for an extension of time, denied his motion to strike Dobo's reply and his declaration for entry of default, and granted Dobo's motion to dismiss. Johnson was given thirty days to oppose the remaining motions and amend his allegations against Dobo.

Remand instructions

No remand. Johnson's claims against Dobo were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend within thirty days. Johnson was also given thirty days to oppose Bloom's and the Corrections Defendants' motions to dismiss.

Court Document

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