David Keon Ross v. Capital Defenders Office et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia grants David Keon Ross's application to proceed in forma pauperis but dismisses his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court concludes that the claims against the judge are barred by judicial immunity or lack of a justiciable controversy, the claims against the detectives are time-barred, the Capital Defenders Office is not a suable person under § 1983, and the claims are also barred by Heck v. Humphrey.

Holdings

1. The complaint failed to state a viable claim against Judge Wallerstein because the challenged denial of immediate release was an act performed in the judge's adjudicatory capacity, and there was no justiciable controversy supporting the claim.
2. Ross's claims against Detectives Ensor and Bartol were time-barred because § 1983 claims borrow the state limitations period for personal-injury actions, which is two years in Virginia, and the claims arose from conduct connected to his 2017 conviction.
3. The Capital Defenders Office was not a person with capacity to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. Ross's damages claims were not cognizable under § 1983 because success on the claims would necessarily implicate the validity of his conviction or sentence, and he did not allege that the conviction or sentence had been invalidated.
5. A complaint filed in forma pauperis must be dismissed at any time if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, applying the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the complaint stated a viable § 1983 claim against the judicial defendant for denying Ross's request for immediate release.
2. Whether Ross's § 1983 claims against the detectives were barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations.
3. Whether the Capital Defenders Office was a suable person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. Whether Ross's damages claims challenging the basis for his ongoing detention were cognizable under § 1983 despite the absence of an allegation that his conviction or sentence had been invalidated.
5. Whether the complaint was subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Disposition

dismissed