State v. Labrum

2025 UT 12 · Supreme Court of the State of Utah · May 1, 2025 · No. Case No. 20220889

Summary

The Utah Supreme Court clarifies the standard under the state constitution's Due Process Clause for when the State may refile criminal charges after a preliminary hearing fails to establish probable cause. Interpreting prior precedent, the court holds that due process prohibits refiling only upon a showing of intentional prosecutorial misconduct or bad faith, rejecting broader prophylactic restrictions. The opinion vacates the lower court's dismissal of rape charges against the defendant and remands for reconsideration under the refined rule.

Court
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
Writing for the Court
Associate Chief Justice Pearce; Chief Justice Durrant; Justice Petersen; Justice Hagen; Justice Pohlaman
Jurisdiction
Utah
Decision date
May 1, 2025
Docket number
Case No. 20220889
Procedural posture
Appeal from the First District Court, Cache County
Standard of review
Question of law reviewed for correctness
Precedential value
Published
Parties
State of Utah v. Kyli Jenae Labrum
Disposition
remanded

Topics

due processprosecutorial misconductcriminal procedureprocedural due processappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether State v. Brickey and its progeny prohibit the State from refiling rape charges after a preliminary‑hearing dismissal under the Utah Constitution’s Due Process Clause.
  2. Whether the Victims’ Rights Amendment abrogates Brickey’s requirement that prosecutors present all evidence at the preliminary hearing.

Holdings

  1. Brickey’s operative proposition remains valid: the Utah Due Process Clause precludes unbridled prosecutorial discretion to refile charges after a magistrate has dismissed them for insufficient evidence, and the State must show good cause and lack of bad‑faith intent to refile.
  2. The portion of Brickey that required the State to present all evidence or legal theories at the preliminary hearing is abrogated by the Victims’ Rights Amendment; withholding a theory is not a constitutional violation absent a showing of bad‑faith or intent to harass.

Key quotations

We vacate the district court’s order granting Labrum’s motion to dismiss and remand for new proceedings under the clarified Brickey standard. (¶74)
Brickey announced that our Due Process Clause “preclude[s] vesting the State with . . . unbridled discretion” to refile criminal charges after a magistrate judge has once found insufficient evidence to bind a defendant over for trial. (¶29)

Factual background

Kyli Jenae Labrum, age 26, engaged in a year‑long sexual relationship with 16‑year‑old T.S., the son of a close family friend. The State charged Labrum with ten counts of rape and one count of forcible sexual abuse, asserting special‑trust and enticement theories of non‑consent. The magistrate found insufficient evidence of non‑consent and dismissed the charges. The State later refiled the original charges, prompting the present appeal.

Procedural history

The magistrate judge dismissed the refiled rape charges, holding that Brickey barred refiling because the State failed to show good cause and had withheld evidence. The State appealed the dismissal.

Remand instructions

The district court shall apply the clarified Brickey standard: the State bears the burden to show that refiling was not done in bad‑faith or with intent to harass, and the VRA‑based limitation on evidence‑withholding does not itself constitute a due‑process violation.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…