State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45

48 P.3d 953 (Utah 2002) · Supreme Court of Utah · April 30, 2002 · No. No. 20000233

Summary

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Darryl Hubbard’s convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony on eyewitness-identification reliability and that the photo-array identifications were sufficiently reliable and not impermissibly suggestive under the federal or Utah constitutions. The court also addressed the defendant’s claim concerning sidebar voir dire conducted outside his presence.

Court
Supreme Court of Utah
Writing for the Court
Justice Wilkins; Chief Justice Durham; Associate Chief Justice Durrant; Justice Howe; Justice Russon
Jurisdiction
Utah
Decision date
April 30, 2002
Docket number
No. 20000233
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault, challenging the exclusion of expert eyewitness-identification testimony, denial of a motion to suppress eyewitness identifications, and sidebar voir dire conducted outside his presence and off the record.
Standard of review
The exclusion of expert testimony was reviewed for abuse of discretion. The constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony was reviewed for correctness as a question of law, with clearly erroneous review for subsidiary factual determinations. The unpreserved challenge to Hubbard's absence during sidebar voir dire was reviewed for plain error.
Precedential value
Published Utah Supreme Court opinion; precedential
Parties
Darryl Hubbard v. State of Utah
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

evidencesuppression of evidencedue processjury selectioncriminal procedure

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedureevidenceconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding expert testimony regarding the fallibility and reliability of eyewitness identification.
  2. Whether the pretrial photo array was impermissibly suggestive or the resulting eyewitness identifications were constitutionally unreliable under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions.
  3. Whether conducting sidebar voir dire discussions with prospective jurors outside Hubbard's presence and off the record violated his right to be present, and whether any such error was waived or constituted plain error.

Holdings

  1. A trial court has discretion to exclude proposed expert testimony on eyewitness-identification reliability when the testimony would amount to a lecture instructing the jury how to weigh eyewitness evidence, particularly where the court gives an appropriate cautionary eyewitness-identification instruction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hubbard's expert testimony.
  2. The photo array was not impermissibly suggestive, and the eyewitness identifications were sufficiently reliable under both federal and Utah due process standards. Admission of the identification testimony therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
  3. Assuming without deciding that a defendant has a right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors, Hubbard waived that right by failing to object or otherwise assert it. Because the right was waived, the trial court committed no plain error.

Key quotations

We have not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification. (¶ 14)
Courts must simply decide whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly unreliable identification testimony before the jury. (¶ 30)
We hold that (1) the trial court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion in not allowing an expert witness to testify regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identification, (2) the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress testimony about the pretrial photo identifications because the identification testimony regarding the photo array was not violative of the due process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions, and (3) the defendant waived any right he may have had to be present while the trial court conducted voir dire of prospective jurors at sidebar. (¶ 35)

Factual background

An armed assailant entered Jeffrey Gunderson's basement apartment after identifying himself as “Six Nine,” shot Gunderson in the leg, restrained Cheryl Moss, threatened the occupants, and took cash and marijuana from a safe. Gunderson and Moss promptly described the assailant to police, and approximately three weeks later each independently identified Hubbard from a six-photo array containing photographs of similarly appearing African-American men with goatees. Gunderson and Moss identified Hubbard at trial, and the trial court gave a cautionary Long eyewitness-identification instruction.

Procedural history

The district court denied Hubbard's motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony and denied his request to present expert testimony concerning the fallibility of eyewitness identification. During jury selection, the court conducted sidebar discussions with prospective jurors without Hubbard present and without a record of the discussions. The jury convicted Hubbard of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.

Court Document

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