Utah County v. Alexanderson

2005 UT 67 (2005) · Supreme Court of Utah · October 14, 2005 · No. No. 20030516

Summary

The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah County could not obtain extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B because it had failed to pursue an available direct appeal from the Utah County Career Service Council's decision. The court concluded that the County's direct-appeal period had expired and that the rulings of the district court and court of appeals were invalid. The Career Service Council's decision in favor of the sheriff's deputies therefore remained binding.

Court
Supreme Court of Utah
Writing for the Court
Justice Nehring; Chief Justice Durham; Associate Chief Justice Wilkins; Justice Durrant; Justice Parrish
Jurisdiction
Utah
Decision date
October 14, 2005
Docket number
No. 20030516
Procedural posture
On certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. Utah County sought extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B after the Utah County Career Service Council ruled for the defendant sheriff's deputies. The district court granted extraordinary relief, the court of appeals reinstated the Council's decision, and the Utah Supreme Court held that the extraordinary-relief petition was invalid because Utah County had failed to pursue its available direct appeal to the district court.
Standard of review
The court did not reach the merits of the Rule 65B review because the petition was jurisdictionally unavailable; extraordinary relief is available only when no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists.
Precedential value
Published Utah Supreme Court opinion; precedential
Parties
Utah County v. George S. Alexanderson, Charles H. Martin
Disposition
other

Topics

subject matter jurisdictionwrit of certiorariexhaustion of remediesjudicial review of agency actionappellate procedure

Practice areas

civil procedureadministrative lawappellate proceduremunicipal lawremedies

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Utah County could obtain extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B when it had an available statutory right to appeal the Career Service Council's decision directly to the district court.
  2. Whether Utah County's right to a direct appeal remained available eight years after the Council's decision when the governing pre-2001 statute did not expressly specify an appeal period.
  3. Whether the Utah Supreme Court could reach the merits of the court of appeals' Rule 65B analysis.

Holdings

  1. A petition for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B is unavailable when the petitioner had a plain, speedy, and adequate statutory remedy by direct appeal to the district court.
  2. Under the pre-2001 statutory framework, Utah County had thirty days from the Career Service Council's June 30, 1997 decision to perfect a direct appeal to the district court; failing to do so forfeited its claim to extraordinary relief.

Key quotations

An extraordinary writ is not a proceeding for general review, and cannot be used as such. (¶ 6)
Due to its failure to exhaust all available avenues of appeal, extraordinary relief is not available to Utah County. (¶ 9)

Factual background

George S. Alexanderson and Charles H. Martin, Utah County sheriff's deputies, filed a grievance in January 1997 challenging the County's promotion procedures. The Utah County Career Service Council ruled in the deputies' favor on June 30, 1997. Utah County did not pursue the statutory direct appeal to the district court and instead sought extraordinary relief under Rule 65B.

Procedural history

The deputies challenged Utah County's promotion procedures before the Utah County Career Service Council, which ruled in their favor on June 30, 1997. Rather than filing a direct appeal to the district court under the County Personnel Management Act, Utah County petitioned for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. The district court granted relief, but the court of appeals reinstated the Council's decision. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari but concluded that the procedural defect and lapse of the direct-appeal period deprived the courts of jurisdiction to grant extraordinary relief.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…