State v. Fullerton

Summary

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Gregory Todd Fullerton's conviction for child abuse homicide. The court held that his confession was voluntary and that he was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the relevant portion of his police interview. It also clarified that Utah courts must apply the federal totality-of-the-circumstances test for Miranda custody rather than relying rigidly on the factors identified in Salt Lake City v. Carner.

Holdings

1. Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes must be determined under the totality of the objective circumstances, asking whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. The Utah courts may consider the Carner factors when relevant, but may not rely on them rigidly or exclusively.
2. Fullerton was not in custody during the relevant portion of the interview and therefore was not entitled to Miranda warnings; the district court properly denied suppression on that ground.
3. The confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances and was not rendered inadmissible by the officers' alleged misrepresentations concerning the strength of the evidence.
4. The court would not consider three challenges to expert testimony because they were not preserved and Fullerton did not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. The fourth challenge afforded no appellate remedy because the trial court sustained the objection and Fullerton requested no additional relief.
5. The court would not consider Fullerton's due-process challenge to the prosecutor's closing argument because he failed to object contemporaneously and raised the issue only in a motion for a new trial, without asserting plain error or exceptional circumstances.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Fullerton was in custody for purposes of Miranda during his police interview and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings.
2. Whether the interrogation tactics rendered Fullerton's confession involuntary under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
3. Whether the court could consider Fullerton's challenges to expert testimony when three objections were unpreserved and the trial court had sustained the fourth objection without Fullerton requesting additional relief.
4. Whether the court could consider Fullerton's prosecutorial-misconduct and due-process challenge to closing argument when he failed to object at trial and raised the issue only in a motion for a new trial.

Disposition

affirmed