Summary
The Vermont Supreme Court considers whether a real estate broker presented sufficient evidence that another broker fraudulently interfered with his brokerage agreement and commission expectancy. The court holds that circumstantial evidence could support an inference of communication and a fraudulent scheme, making directed verdict improper, and reverses and remands.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence and reasonable inferences were sufficient to submit to a jury the issue of whether Lussier fraudulently interfered with Giroux's brokerage agreement and commission expectancy.
- Whether a real-estate broker's reasonable expectancy of profit under a nonexclusive listing agreement is protected against fraudulent interference.
- Whether the absence of direct evidence that Lussier communicated with the purchasers required a directed verdict for Lussier.
- Whether the trial court's reference to the pleadings could properly be treated as reversing its prior denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Holdings
- The directed verdict was improper because the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff's favor, permitted a jury to infer that Lussier communicated with the purchasers and participated in a scheme that deprived Giroux of his brokerage commission.
- The law protects a real-estate broker's reasonable expectancy of profit arising from a brokerage agreement, even when the agreement is not exclusive and does not itself guarantee a commission.
- The purchasers' prior knowledge that the property was for sale would not, by itself, defeat liability for a fraudulent scheme that used Giroux's information and efforts to bypass his commission.
- The trial court's directed-verdict order could not properly reverse its earlier denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and the Supreme Court did not construe it as doing so.
Key quotations
“All persons legitimately operating in the business community have a right to security against unlawful interference in their commercial dealings with others.” (238 A.2d at 66)
“The law's protection is not restricted to enforceable contracts. It extends with equal force to reasonable expectancy of profit.” (238 A.2d at 66-67)
“There is no legal right to deceptively invade the area of another's agreement.” (238 A.2d at 67)
“The issue is whether a fraudulent scheme of the defendant prevented the plaintiff from performing his undertaking with the Rondeaus at the expense of his commission.” (238 A.2d at 67)
Factual background
Giroux, a licensed real-estate broker, obtained a written listing agreement to sell the Rondeaus' 350-acre farm and related personal property. He told Antonio Lussier, also a real-estate broker and the father of prospective purchasers, about the property, the listing, and its price; Lussier suggested a supposed outside prospect and sought additional pricing information while promising to communicate with his son. Shortly thereafter, members of the Lussier family or their associates inspected and purchased the property, and the owners cancelled Giroux's listing. The evidence also showed business and financial connections among Lussier and the purchasers, supporting an inference that Lussier communicated the information to them and participated in a scheme to bypass Giroux.
Procedural history
Giroux obtained a listing agreement from the owners of a Vermont farm and alleged that Lussier fraudulently obtained information about the listing and facilitated a sale to Lussier's relatives or associates, thereby depriving Giroux of his commission. The trial court directed a verdict for Lussier, despite having previously denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff's favor, supported jury inferences of communication and fraudulent interference, reversed the judgment, and remanded.
Remand instructions
The cause was remanded for further proceedings, including submission of the factual issues to a jury consistent with the court's opinion.