State v. Winnie

174 Vt. 626 (2002) · Supreme Court of Vermont · December 18, 2002

Summary

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Richard Winnie’s motion to dismiss charges under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. The court held that the Act’s 180-day period did not begin until the prisoner’s request for final disposition was delivered to both the prosecuting officer and the court, relying on Fex v. Michigan.

Court
Supreme Court of Vermont
Writing for the Court
Per Curiam
Jurisdiction
Vermont
Decision date
December 18, 2002
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed the Bennington District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss criminal charges based on an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.
Standard of review
De novo review of the legal interpretation and application of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act; the court reviewed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
Precedential value
Published Vermont Supreme Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Richard Winnie v. State of Vermont
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

speedy trialcriminal procedurestatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedureappellate procedureinterstate detainers

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the 180-day period under Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act begins when a prisoner gives a final-disposition request to a prison official or only when the request is actually delivered to both the court and the prosecuting officer.
  2. Whether the trial court's alleged sua sponte continuance after expiration of the IAD time limit required dismissal of the charges.

Holdings

  1. The 180-day period under 28 V.S.A. § 1503(a), implementing Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition has actually been delivered to both the court and the prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer.
  2. The court did not decide whether the trial court erred in granting a continuance because the 180-day period had not expired.

Key quotations

The Court held that “the 180-day time period in Article 111(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” (at 627)

Factual background

In June 2001, Richard Winnie was charged in Vermont with attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle at an excessive speed. On September 19, 2001, while incarcerated in Massachusetts, he signed a request for final disposition and a prison official signed a certificate of inmate status. The prosecutor received notice, but the Vermont district court did not receive the request and had no notice of it until at least October 16, 2001. Winnie moved to dismiss on April 1, 2002, arguing that more than 180 days had elapsed since September 19, 2001.

Procedural history

Winnie was charged in Vermont with attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and excessive-speed operation. While incarcerated in Massachusetts, he requested final disposition of the Vermont charges, but the request was delivered to the prosecutor and not the district court. He moved to dismiss after asserting that the IAD's 180-day period had expired; the district court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed.

Court Document

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