Rowe v. Lavanway

180 Vt. 505 (2006) · Supreme Court of Vermont · May 30, 2006

Summary

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s determination that an 1881 deed created an appurtenant right-of-way benefiting the defendants’ property. The court held that the plaintiffs’ predecessor had not extinguished the easement through ouster or abandonment. It also held that, because the deed imposed no use restriction, the right-of-way could be used for automobile travel.

Court
Supreme Court of Vermont
Jurisdiction
Vermont
Decision date
May 30, 2006
Procedural posture
Plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment following a court trial in favor of defendants in a dispute over the existence, extinguishment, and permissible use of an easement.
Precedential value
Published Vermont Supreme Court opinion; precedential
Parties
James Rowe, Valerie Banschbach v. Michael Lavanway, Janet Lavanway
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

easementsimplied easementsappellate procedurestandard of reviewreal estate

Practice areas

real estateproperty lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the 1881 deed created an appurtenant right-of-way despite the absence of words of inheritance in the granting clause.
  2. Whether the right-of-way was extinguished by ouster, adverse possession, or abandonment through the conduct of plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title.
  3. Whether the deed permitted the right-of-way to be used for automobile travel.

Holdings

  1. The 1881 deed created an appurtenant right-of-way benefiting the conveyed parcel. The absence of words of inheritance in the granting clause did not control because the deed must be read as a whole, and the reference to appurtenances supported an appurtenant easement.
  2. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the right-of-way had been extinguished. Ouster requires open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and adverse possession of the easement for fifteen years that is unequivocal and incompatible with the dominant owner's use; abandonment additionally requires nonuse plus acts conclusively and unequivocally manifesting an intent to relinquish the easement or a purpose inconsistent with its future existence.
  3. The right-of-way could be used for automobile travel. Because the 1881 deed imposed no limitation on the mode of use, the court would not import a restriction merely because transportation technology had changed from animal traffic to automobiles.

Key quotations

An appurtenant easement is one that serves a parcel of land rather than a particular person, and a construction that an easement is appurtenant is favored. (509)
While an easement may be extinguished by an abandonment, nonuse alone will not suffice, no matter how long continued. (510)
To establish an abandonment there must be, in addition to non user, acts by the owner of the dominant tenement conclusively and unequivocally manifesting either a present intent to relinquish the easement or a purpose inconsistent with its future existence. (511)

Factual background

The parties were neighboring landowners in Jericho, Vermont. Defendants' property lay north of plaintiffs' property and was accessed by a lane extending from Palmer Lane across plaintiffs' easternmost land to defendants' meadow. The 1881 deed in defendants' chain of title granted Brown and his heirs or assigns a right to pass through the grantors' land and referred to the granted premises with their appurtenances. A predecessor of plaintiffs constructed a driveway and berm across or along the lane, but the trial court found that the construction did not objectively constitute a clear and affirmative ouster and that the route remained accessible, including by a four-wheel-drive vehicle.

Procedural history

Plaintiffs filed a 2002 complaint alleging that defendants trespassed by using an alleged right-of-way across plaintiffs' property and sought injunctive relief. After a court trial and site visit, the trial court found that defendants possessed an appurtenant right-of-way created by an 1881 deed, rejected plaintiffs' claim that the easement had been extinguished by their predecessor's conduct, and held that automobile use was permitted. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.

Court Document

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